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Abstract 
 
In their 1997 paper “Are Transitions Transitory?”, Milada Vachudova and Timothy Snyder 
predicted that the ethnically homogenous states of post-communist Central and Eastern Europe 
(CEE) would experience an uncomplicated democratic transition. At once the scholars predicted 
that three other states, Romania, Bulgaria, and Slovakia, would fail to democratize, particularly 
because they were not characterized by these three factors. The key differentiating factor in the 
paper, and in turn what the three factors were expected to correlate with, was the degree of ethnic 
nationalism in each state’s respective politics. By contrast, the situation in 2017 looks decidedly 
different. Hungary under Viktor Orbán has sunk to Romania- and Bulgaria- levels of democracy, 
and Poland’s recent re-election of the populist Law and Justice (PiS) party seems to signal the 
emergence of an analogous trend in that state. Further, both of these parties have at once 
mobilized ethnic nationalist rhetoric in order to legitimize their own political ambitions. The aim 
of this paper, then, is to answer two questions relating to Vachudova and Snyder’s 1997 
formulations. The first question concerns why, contrary to the expectations of these scholars, 
Hungary and Poland have seen the emergence of ethnic nationalist politics. The second question 
concerns why Hungary, though seemingly identical to Poland in its initial democratic conditions, 
has seen the mobilization of ethnic nationalism to a far more extreme and anti-democratic 
degree.  
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1. Introduction 
 In their 1997 paper “Are Transitions Transitory?”, Milada Vachudova and Timothy 
Snyder predicted that the ethnically homogenous states of post-communist Central and Eastern 
Europe (CEE) would experience an uncomplicated democratic transition.1 In their formulation, 
three such states – Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic – would encounter success in this 
process as a result of three factors: their ethnic homogeneity, their relatively strong economies, 
and their successful breakages from communist rule.2 By contrast, the scholars predicted that 
three other states, Romania, Bulgaria, and Slovakia, would fail to democratize particularly 
because they were not characterized by these three factors.3 The key differentiating factor in the 
paper, and in turn what the three factors were expected to correlate with, was the degree of ethnic 
nationalism in each state’s respective politics.4 
 By contrast, the situation in 2017 looks decidedly different. Hungary, for one, has 
become recognized during the tenure of Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and his party, Fidesz, for 
its rejection of liberal democracy in favor of Putin- or Erdogan-style governance.5 And more 
recently, Poland has re-elected the populist Law and Justice party, whose incumbency has 
already resulted in censure from the European Union (EU) over its unlawful actions in relation to 
Poland’s constitutional tribunal, among other anti-democratic moves.6 Further, as we will see, 
both of these parties have at once mobilized ethnic nationalist rhetoric in order to legitimize their 
own political ambitions. As such the dual cases of Hungary and Poland appear to controvert 
                                               
1 Milada Anna Vachudova and Timothy Snyder, “Are Transitions Transitory? Two Types of Political 
Change in Eastern Europe Since 1989”, East European Politics and Societies 11, no. 1 (Winter 1997): 2. 
2 Vachudova and Snyder, “Are Transitions Transitory?”, 2-3. 
3 Vachudova and Snyder, “Are Transitions Transitory?”, 3. 
4 Vachudova and Snyder, “Are Transitions Transitory?”, 2. 
5 Zoltan Simon, “Orban Says He Seeks to End Liberal Democracy in Hungary,” Bloomberg (New York), 
July 28, 2014. 
6 “Safeguarding democratic rule within the EU,” The Economist (London, UK), May 23, 2017. 
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entirely Vachudova and Snyder’s 1997 expectations, both as pertains to the deteriorating 
conditions of their democracies, and relatedly, the mobilization of ethnic nationalist rhetoric 
therein.  
 The aim of this paper, then, is to answer two questions relating to Vachudova and 
Snyder’s 1997 formulations. The first question concerns why, contrary to the expectations of 
Vachudova and Snyder, Hungary and Poland have seen the emergence of ethnic nationalist 
politics. The second question concerns why Hungary, though seemingly identical to Poland, has 
seen the mobilization of ethnic nationalism to a far more extreme and anti-democratic degree 
than Poland has.  
 This thesis will proceed in three main chapters. In the next chapter I will review the 
literature on the nature of nationalism in CEE. This investigation will reveal two main errors in 
the formulations of Vachudova and Snyder, which in turn will help to organize the rest of this 
paper’s argument. Namely the review of the literature suggests first that Vachudova and Snyder 
overplayed the influence of the aforementioned factors in anticipating the development of ethnic 
nationalism. By contrast, the scholars failed to anticipate that nationalism is a much deeper and 
more historically-rooted phenomenon for post-communist CEE on the whole. Accordingly, 
section 3.1 will respond to the historical motivations for ethnic nationalism in post-communist 
CEE, particularly as aggravated by the experience of communism after the Second World War. 
Section 3.2 will respond to the specific historical motivations for Hungarian and Polish 
nationalism, in order both to respond to Vachudova and Snyder’s incomplete formulations, and 
in turn to give necessary context for subsequent political developments in each state. Section 3.3 
will affirm Vachudova and Snyder’s categorization of Hungary and Poland as politically similar, 
but will do so with a sensitivity to underlying historical trends within the region on the whole. 
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As such, Vachudova and Snyder’s second error had to do with their overly conflating the 
development of ethnic nationalism with anti-democratic trends in post-communist states (though, 
given their formulations, these claims failed even to extend to Hungary or Poland). That is, while 
the findings from section 3 will show that the ethnic nationalist traditions of Hungary and Poland 
are on the whole rather similar, their distinct courses in the post-communist period suggest the 
importance of another factor in linking ethnic nationalism to anti-democratic trends in these two 
states. In the view of this paper, the variable that best helps to explain this is the degree of 
pluralism in each country’s respective right (i.e., the diversity of each given state’s conservative 
element). As such, in section 4 I will analyze the courses of Hungarian and Polish 
democratization to argue, essentially, that the greater prevalence of anti-democratic trends in the 
former was facilitated by a weaker degree of pluralism on the right. Section 5 will conclude and 
summarize the paper’s findings in greater detail. 
Altogether this paper affirms that ethnic nationalism is, as ever, an important factor in the 
politics of all post-communist CEE states (and given recent developments, for the West on the 
whole). In so doing this paper will reject Vachudova and Snyder’s claim that ethnic nationalism 
is strictly a negative political force in itself. In fact, as the review of the literature will reveal, 
ethnic nationalism is at once a useful political tool in the post-communist space for moving past 
the legacy of communism. In turn, this paper argues that ethnic nationalism is only dangerous to 
the health of a state’s democracy when it is coupled with a lack of competition on the right. This 
situation allows, as we will see in the case of Hungary, for one politician to mobilize ethnic 
nationalist sentiment in order to consolidate his own power and in so doing achieve anti-
democratic ends. 
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2. Literature review 
 There exists a diversity of perspectives on the subject of nationalism in Central and 
Eastern Europe (CEE). In order to better understand the incomplete nature of Vachudova and 
Snyder’s 1997 approach, it will be instructive to review some of the relevant literature on this 
subject. This will proceed in three parts: first by characterizing the more traditional ‘fixed’ view 
of CEE, next by presenting some scholarly refutations of this first view, and finally by 
synthesizing these competing views through some more contemporary accounts of the region. It 
is worth mentioning that this review of the literature is fitted to the formulations of Vachudova 
and Snyder and as such does not comment on the more general ideas of nationalism studies on 
the whole.  
A discussion of these three sets of ideas will in turn give us the necessary tools to respond 
to Vachudova and Snyder’s incomplete formulations. Generally the literature suggests their 
misunderstandings were twofold. First it suggests that the scholars overplayed the roles of 
superficial factors, ethnic homogeneity chief among them, in the development of ethnic 
nationalist sentiment in CEE. By contrast a review of the literature suggests that for the region on 
the whole, nationalism is a much deeper and more historically-rooted phenomenon than what 
Vachudova and Snyder anticipated. Second it suggests that Vachudova and Snyder overly 
conflated the degree to which this nationalist tradition would necessarily affect, one way or the 
other, democratic trends in these states. While this paper will only respond to the specific 
developments in Hungary and Poland, even a cursory overview of the politics of the region 
implies (as suggested in section 1) the need for a different, though related, variable in explaining 
the trends in CEE politics.  
Golant 11 
2.1. The ‘fixed’ view of nationalism 
One of the overarching schools of thought on CEE nationalism takes a general view of 
Europe that can best be described as Manichean. John Plamenatz offers one of the clearest 
articulations of this view in his 1989 essay “Two Types of Nationalism.” Plamenatz takes the 
view of CEE nationalism as being motivated by an inherent attention to ethnic considerations.7 
By contrast Western European (WE) nationalism is animated by civic considerations.8 Stefan 
Auer explains that for Plamenatz, and for the ‘fixed’ camp generally, the nationalism of CEE 
developed from the region’s delayed historical development, and in turn presumes a kind of 
ressentiment which points to, as Auer argues, the superiority of the political traditions of the 
West.9 Implicit in this assumption is that the differences between these nationalist traditions are 
fundamental and as such ‘fixed.’ 
 Another noteworthy voice from the ‘fixed’ camp is that of György Schöpflin, a 
Hungarian scholar and Minister of European Parliament (MEP) for Fidesz. Schöpflin offers a 
scathing criticism of what he holds to be Western scholarly inattention to the centrality of ethnic 
considerations within CEE nationalism. He characterizes these accounts, which will be discussed 
in section 2.2, as representing a “denial of [...] the ethnic underpinning of our plausibility 
structures.”10 Schöpflin submits that an accurate account of post-communist development, along 
with the role played by nationalism therein, would respond to such ethnic considerations rather 
than eschewing them in favor of civic, liberal democratic ideals.11 Schöpflin’s view reiterates the 
                                               
7 John Gledhill, “The Power of Ethnic Nationalism: Foucault's Bio-power and the Development of Ethnic 
Nationalism in Eastern Europe,” National Identities 7, no. 4 (2005): 350. 
8 Gledhill, “The Power of Ethnic Nationalism,” 350. 
9 Stefan Auer, “Two Types of Nationalism in Europe?” Russian and Euro-Asian Bulletin 7, no. 12 
(December 1997): 5-6. 
10 György Schöpflin, “Liberal Pluralism and Post-Communism,” in Can Liberal Pluralism be Exported?, 
eds. Will Kymlicka and Magda Opalski (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001): 112. 
11 Schöpflin, “Liberal Pluralism and Post-Communism,” 112.  
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point that CEE nationalism is at once inherently motivated by ethnic considerations and further 
that it is less mature than that of the West.12 
 The notion of ‘fixed’ nationalisms is also articulated by John Gledhill in his essay “The 
Power of Ethnic Nationalism.” Here Gledhill argues that the nationalist traditions of CEE can be 
explained through Michel Foucault’s notion of ‘biopower’ (i.e., the control of and use of human 
bodies for political ends).13 Moreover, Gledhill emphasizes the importance of shared “cultural 
bonds” such as language and religion within CEE societies for the region’s in-group 
psychology.14As such for Gledhill nationalist ideas in CEE developed along familial lines, and 
this in turn explains the persistence of ethno-cultural traditions within those states (i.e., 
Schöpflin’s “ethnic plausibility structures”).  
Moreover, Gledhill’s ideas about CEE nationalism are animated by the intellectual 
tradition that came out of the German Enlightenment and Romantic periods.15 He points to the 
contradictions between the ideas of Johann Gottfried Herder, the German Enlightenment figure 
known in part for his emphasis on the volk (ethnic people) with those of civically-minded 
thinkers like Jean-Jacques Rousseau and John Stuart Mill.16 Gledhill claims that these 
differences had a real effect on the development of nationalism in CEE, writing: 
[The] fusion of the legitimating idea of an ethno-nation with the political unit of 
the state served to entrench and institutionalise the exclusionary ideas of ethnic 
nationalism in Eastern Europe. So, while some in Western Europe sought to 
actively aggregate the ‘exotic’ East, intellectual undercurrents flowing from the 
West served to undermine this project and so independent ethno-national 
identities and states developed in Eastern Europe.17 
 
                                               
12 Auer, “Two Types of Nationalism in Europe?” 1. 
13 Gledhill, “The Power of Ethnic Nationalism,” 348. 
14 Gledhill, “The Power of Ethnic Nationalism,” 350. 
15 Gledhill, “The Power of Ethnic Nationalism,” 348. 
16 Gledhill, “The Power of Ethnic Nationalism,” 349. 
17 Gledhill, “The Power of Ethnic Nationalism,” 366. 
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Rogers Smith in turn offers an explanation of this perceived inattention by Western scholarship 
to ethno-cultural considerations. Smith argues that the absence of a theory of ‘people-building’ 
(that is, to match theories of state- and nation-building) in the Western intellectual tradition can 
be understood as a function of American and Western European political thought being 
predominantly concerned with questions of the individual against the rule of aristocracy as 
opposed to, for instance, matters of group identity.18 Smith, though not a scholar of CEE 
nationalism in his own right, aptly communicates the differences between the intellectual 
traditions of CEE and WE and in turn provides further context to Gledhill’s claim. 
 As suggested, the ‘fixed’ nationalist camp also takes evidence from the history of the 
CEE region. Lonnie Johnson for one points to the region’s “peculiar, belated feudalism,” which 
he describes as a “second serfdom” that emerged from the Thirty Years’ War.19 This in turn is 
believed to have stunted the economic growth of CEE, again animating the notion of the region’s 
inferiority to the West.20 Johnson explains further that the developments of the (British) 
Industrial Revolution, along with the political developments of the French Revolution had a 
diminished effect on the nations of CEE and as such further exacerbated the differences in 
development between these so-called two halves of Europe.21 While Johnson, like Smith, is not a 
scholar of CEE nationalism outright, his historical account helps explain the qualitative 
differences motivating the view of CEE nationalism as tied to its history. 
 
  
                                               
18 Rogers M. Smith, Stories of Peoplehood: The Politics and Morals of Political Membership (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003): 9. 
19 Lonnie R. Johnson, Central Europe: Enemies, Neighbors, Friends (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
2010): 90.  
20 Johnson, Central Europe: Enemies, Neighbors, Friends, 90. 
21 Johnson, Central Europe: Enemies, Neighbors, Friends, 92. 
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2.2. Rejoinders to the ‘fixed’ view 
In contrast to the ‘fixed’ view of CEE nationalism, there exists a substantive literature 
that pushes back on the notion of CEE nationalism as being inexorably inferior to that of the 
West. While it is difficult to ascribe one overarching label to this set of views, they are all in 
agreement that the notion of CEE nationalism as ‘fixed’ is irrelevant, either for reasons of 
historical inaccuracy, lack of insight into contemporary politics, or otherwise. 
To begin, one of Gledhill’s most ardent critics is Will Kymlicka, who argues that a 
number of contemporary liberal democracies (e.g., France, Britain, and the United States) have 
pursued illiberal, undemocratic, and ethnically-motivated policies of assimilation toward their 
minority populations.22 Kymlicka claims that while these democracies have in the modern day 
embraced, or perhaps evolved toward, civic versions of their nationalist traditions, they 
nonetheless must grapple with their attempts at constructing overarching nations instead of 
recognizing the autonomy of their minority populations.23 The tragic histories of American 
slavery or British and French imperialism, for instance, can hardly be said to have been 
motivated by civic considerations, Kymlicka argues. As such Western political history, or 
political history on the whole, has been motivated by ethnicity, and it is disingenuous to 
overemphasize the existence of this trend in CEE. 
Further, a number of scholars reject ‘fixed’ views of CEE nationalism along practical 
lines. Kataryna Wolczuk and Galina Yemelianova argue that the tendency by Western academics 
to think in overly general terms about CEE nationalism during the region’s early post-communist 
democratization had subsequent implications on the policies of international organizations like 
                                               
22 Will Kymlicka, “Western Political Theory and Ethnic Relations in Eastern Europe,” in Can Liberal 
Pluralism be Exported?, eds. Will Kymlicka and Magda Opalski (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001): 25-26. 
23 Kymlicka, “Western Political Theory and Ethnic Relations in Eastern Europe,” 25-26. 
Golant 15 
the EU.24 And Auer responds specifically to the differentiation of nationalisms between the 
various parts of CEE. He draws attention to the fact that by extension of the ‘fixed’ view, the 
states of Central Europe were seen as better disposed to Western ideals of nationalism than their 
Eastern counterparts, which in turn lent itself to its own form of nationalist mythmaking about 
the region.25 Auer explains that ‘fixed’ accounts of Central Europe as being less backwards than 
Eastern Europe had the paradoxical effect of delegitimizing the democratic progress of the latter, 
in turn fostering a ‘superiority complex’ that undermined liberal values.26 
Finally, in stark contrast to the view of CEE nationalism as ‘fixed’ is the school of 
thought that advocates for an evolution away from ethno-cultural considerations entirely. 
Thinkers associated with this set of ideas include Jan-Werner Mueller, most famously for his 
notion of constitutional patriotism,27 as well as Jürgen Habermas for his prolific account of post-
national citizenship.28 This set of ideas, which for its part fits into the civic nationalist or perhaps 
post-national aspirations of the EU, is surely a desirable framework of ends for democratic 
citizenship. It is worth noting that this set of ideas developed in relation to the intellectual 
climate of the immediate post-Cold War period (i.e., the end of a non-ethnic political struggle). 
However it seems given contemporary Western political developments that this view is ahead of 
its time, or at least out of fashion presently.  
                                               
24 Kataryna Wolczuk and Galina Yemelianova, “When the East Meets the West: Exploring Ethnic 
Diversity in Eastern Europe,” Nationalities Papers 36, no. 2 (2008): 184. 
25 Stefan Auer, Liberal Nationalism in Central Europe (London: RoutledgeCourzon, 2004): 21. 
26 Auer, Liberal Nationalism in Central Europe, 21. 
27 Jan-Werner Mueller, Constitutional Patriotism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007). 
28 Klaus-Gerd Giesen, “The Post-National Constellation: Habermas and the ‘Second Modernity,” Res 
Publica 10 (2004): 1-13. 
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2.3. Synthesizing the views 
In addition to these competing sets of views is a third group that points to a synthesis. 
This group contains a number of contemporary accounts of CEE, which look at the specific 
motivating factors for the region’s nationalist traditions along with the ends to which they have 
been deployed. This set of ideas in turn points us to a number of useful conclusions in 
responding to Vachudova and Snyder. 
Scholars in this third group agree with the ‘fixed’ claim that the CEE nationalist tradition 
is motivated by unique historical factors. However this group rejects that these historical factors 
are necessarily and inexorably related to WE nationalism. Instead they argue that the nationalist 
traditions of CEE have little in common with those of WE, and that this in turn suggests that they 
should be examined as one distinct, collective unit. To begin, Klaus von Beyme points to the 
persistence of irredentist politics among CEE states as a problem that is persistent within and 
unique to this region’s politics.29 Further, André Gerrits warns against conflating CEE 
nationalism with that of WE given their different applications in the regions’ respective politics. 
He argues that in CEE nationalism is used by elites as a means to consolidate power while 
presenting an alternative ideology to communism, whereas in the West it is predominantly used 
as a response to globalization and immigration.30 Sarah Cramsey and Jason Wittenberg argue 
that the nationalisms of CEE and WE are further distinguished by their experiences with 
imperialism. They demonstrate that while WE empires sought to integrate various kinds of 
minorities, those of CEE did not develop nearly as coherent or aggressive such policies.31 Taken 
together all of these arguments point to a careful longer-view consideration of the nationalist 
                                               
29 Klaus von Beyme, Transition to Democracy in Eastern Europe (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996): 
51. 
30 André Gerrits, Nationalism in Europe Since 1945 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2016): 135-136. 
31 Sarah Cramsey and Jason Wittenberg, “Timing Is Everything: Changing Norms of Minority Rights and 
the Making of a Polish Nation-State,” Comparative Political Studies 49, no. 11 (2016): 1484. 
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traditions of CEE. Moreover these accounts suggest that the nationalist traditions of CEE are 
rather closely interrelated. 
Additionally this third set of views affirms that CEE nationalism is indeed ethnic in 
nature. However this group goes further, arguing that despite the potentially violent or 
fragmentary nature of ethnic nationalism, this tradition has nevertheless played a progressive 
function in the region’s politics. Gerrits describes ethnic nationalism as having had a 
modernizing role in CEE’s breakage from communist occupation, writing that “nationalism, 
democracy, and modernity [became] inseparably connected.” 32 Charles King substantiates this 
point, characterizing the “homeland” identities of post-communist states as critical to their 
democratic developments.33 Further, in characterizing the resilience of ethnicity to the region’s 
politics, King rather pointedly submits that “no amount of preaching from liberal Western – 
usually American – democracy builders will change this fact.”34 Auer also challenges the 
characterization of CEE nationalism as a strictly dangerous force despite its tragic uses during 
the 20th century. It follows that for Auer a nationalism of a liberal or civic type could be 
achieved in the region, but only in dialogue with each state’s existing ethno-cultural tradition.35 
Smith too, in his 2003 book Stories of Peoplehood, puts forth the general claim that an accurate 
account of any society or its politics must anticipate the use of “chauvinistic political narratives” 
in properly theorizing its development.36 In his argument Smith seems to invoke the work of 
                                               
32 Gerrits, Nationalism in Europe Since 1945, 17. 
33 Charles King, Extreme Politics: Nationalism, Violence, and the End of Eastern Europe (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2010): 153. 
34 King, Extreme Politics, 153. 
35 Auer, Liberal Nationalism in Central Europe, 1. 
36 Smith, Stories of Peoplehood, 9. 
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Anthony Smith, who argued that ethno-cultural narratives are extremely resilient phenomena, 
and so must be readily anticipated by political theorists.37  
Taken together, this set of ideas points to a number of useful takeaways that respond to 
and build on the ideas of the previous two schools. First, in keeping with the views outlined in 
section 2.1, these accounts affirm the importance and resilience of ethnic considerations to CEE 
nationalism on the whole. However, at once, in accordance with the views outlined in section 
2.2, these accounts reject the notion that the ethnic element of CEE nationalism renders it 
necessarily inferior to that of the West, or otherwise incapable of democratic progress. This in 
turn suggests that the emergence of ethnic nationalism in CEE, like any political ideology, could, 
but would not necessarily, signal anti-democratic trends in the region’s politics. Rather this third 
set of views makes clear that the nationalist traditions of CEE on their own, and the ends to 
which they are employed, are dynamic and ought to be considered with nuance. Indeed this point 
is affirmed by King: 
What scholars need to explain, then, can depend on when they get around to 
explaining it. There is little sign that the dependent variables in this field will 
become less mercurial as time passes [...] For theorists, this means that a certain 
degree of humility is still in order. [...] the ability to predict which direction 
change is likely to go, solely from deductive theorizing rather than on the basis of 
intimate familiarity with the facts on the ground [...] Getting used to politics as 
cycles of change, not as transitions [...]38 
 
King, like many of the aforementioned scholars, points to an overview of the history of the 
region in order to better understand its nationalist traditions. This then points us to a refutation of 
Vachudova and Snyder’s approach.  
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2.4. Responding to Vachudova and Snyder 
 A review of the literature on CEE nationalism gives us all of the information we need in 
order to assess the shortcomings of Vachudova and Snyder’s theory. First, it is clear that at the 
heart of Vachudova and Snyder’s predictions were factors that, though important to an analysis 
of politics at the time, failed to respond to the deeper nature of nationalism in CEE. That is, 
while their claims reflected legitimate 1989-era distinctions between two groups of states in post-
communist CEE, their formulation missed the broader underlying trends affecting the region as a 
whole. For this reason Vachudova and Snyder failed, as demonstrated in section 1, to predict the 
course of Hungarian and Polish politics past 1997. To frame this in terms of the literature, 
Vachudova and Snyder took an overly ‘fixed’ view of the ethnically fragmented states (Bulgaria, 
Romania, and Slovakia) and, more relevantly to this paper’s argument, an overly ‘blind’ one of 
the ethnically homogenous ones (Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic). They overestimated 
the degree to which ethnic nationalism in the former group would necessarily stifle its 
democratization and at once overestimated the degree to which the latter group would be able to 
move toward a liberal or civic nationalism.  
From this we can determine that Vachudova and Snyder arrived at their conclusions on 
the basis of transient factors, rather than the broader underlying trend as discussed. As such, in 
order to better understand this, the next section will closely examine the historical trends 
affecting the region’s nationalist traditions on the whole, as well as the traditions of Hungary and 
Poland specifically, in order to better characterize what Vachudova and Snyder missed and what 
has actually transpired in the two states in consideration. Section 3 will first review some 
literature on the experience of the region on the whole, particularly as pertaining to communist 
rule, in order to better characterize overarching trends. It will then turn to the specific 
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experiences of Hungary and Poland in order to give context to subsequent political 
developments. 
Second and relatedly, this review of the literature suggests that the nationalist traditions 
of CEE, while characterized by ethno-cultural considerations, are more complicated and dynamic 
than what Vachudova and Snyder expected. That is, in addition to misunderstanding the nature 
of nationalism in CEE and its mobilizing factors, they further mischaracterized the relationship 
between this nationalist tradition and its implications for the health of CEE democracies. This at 
once suggests that ethnic nationalism on its own does not tell the whole story, and in turn points 
us to another, related variable, which will be discussed in section 4. 
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3. Historical background 
The experience of communism aggravated the nationalist sentiments of the post-
communist CEE states and had important complications for their futures as democracies. This 
first suggests that Hungary and Poland are closer to Bulgaria and Romania than Vachudova and 
Snyder expected, and helps to explain, contrary to their expectations, subsequent political 
complications in the former group. But this alone does not tell the whole story. These 
developments, along with their different ends in Hungary and Poland, will be discussed in 
section 4. For now it is important to note that Vachudova and Snyder ran into problems with 
their predictions insofar as (1) their formulations regarding the nature of ethnic nationalism and 
its development (discussed in this section), and (2) the means through which ethnic nationalism 
stalls democratic progress (discussed in the next section). 
In the first part of this chapter I will argue that Vachudova and Snyder missed the 
underlying historical experiences of CEE on the whole, and for this reason took an overly ‘blind’ 
view of Hungary and Poland. This will help to better understand the nationalist political 
developments in those states, which were missed by their 1997 paper. In the second part of this 
chapter I will first demonstrate that, as with the rest of post-communist CEE, the nationalist 
traditions of Hungary and Poland are deep and dynamic. This will further reveal why Vachudova 
and Snyder were wrong to take an overly ‘blind’ view and in turn give us important context for 
political developments in Hungary and Poland over the past quarter-century. After reviewing the 
traditions of Hungary and Poland I will then affirm Vachudova and Snyder’s treatment of the 
two states as politically similar, albeit with a renewed attention to the overall ubiquity and 
influence of the nationalist moods of post-communist CEE.   
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3.1. The legacy of communism in CEE nationalism 
To begin, we must look to the literature regarding CEE’s experience of communist rule in 
order to better characterize the overall role played by nationalism in the region. This 
investigation, like the next, will give insight into subsequent political developments in the two 
states in consideration. The review of the literature here reveals that nationalism was a broader 
phenomenon in post-communist CEE on the whole, being aggravated by general historical 
experiences, than what Vachudova and Snyder concluded on the basis of more transient factors. 
This of course is an important consideration, given the subsequent nationalist developments in 
Hungary and Poland that motivated this research design. 
There is a substantive literature on the importance of communist context to an 
understanding of both (1) the development of ethno-cultural nationalism in post-communist 
Europe and relatedly (2) the democratization processes of all of the post-communist states. 
Cheng Chen for one demonstrates that area studies accounts of post-Leninist states, as compared 
to comparative ones, argue a far less optimistic view of democratization.39 In this view 
democratization through institution building is seen as secondary to a comprehensive 
understanding of the states’ nationalist sentiments.40 Howard takes this point further, 
demonstrating that while in the more immediate post-communist period, scholars of CEE were 
quick to jump at the new opportunities of the present (i.e., social and economic policies), a more 
measured approach would take a closer look at the region’s experience with communism and 
draw conclusions from there. This affirms the earlier conclusion that communism had an 
overarching effect on the nationalist sentiments of CEE, and in turn points back to one of the 
                                               
39 Cheng Chen, “Illiberal Nationalism in Post-Leninist States,” Dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 
2003: 58. 
40 Chen, “Illiberal Nationalism in Post-Leninist States,” 58. 
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misunderstandings of Vachudova and Snyder’s 1997 framework in overemphasizing distinctions 
between the nationalist sentiments of the two sets of post-communist CEE states. 
The development of nationalist sentiment in all of the states of post-communist CEE has 
roots in the Soviet regime’s treatment of ethnicity. Kataryna Wolczuk and Galina Yemelianova 
explain that while the Soviet regime officially embraced an internationalist ideology, this in turn 
complicated the status of ethnicity by “[granting it] explicit political recognition” while at once 
forging the supra-national identity of the Soviet people (sovetskii narod).41 This process entailed 
the mandatory adoption of the Cyrillic alphabet, as well as the institution of Russian as the 
lingua franca of the Soviet Union.42 Moreover the regime’s treatment of its many ethnic groups 
was often arbitrary and inconsistent, further complicating and undermining the status of ethnicity 
for several generations.43 Will Kymlicka adds that in spite of all of these policies, the Soviet 
regime was unable to totally erase national allegiances, but rather only succeeded in suppressing 
them (therein setting the stage for resurgences after its collapse).44 He writes: “Despite a 
complete monopoly over education and the media, Communist regimes were unable to get 
Croats, Slovaks and Ukrainians to think of themselves primarily as ‘Yugoslavs’, 
‘Czechoslovaks’, or ‘Soviets.’”45 This is salient in formulating a response to Vachudova and 
Snyder, who as discussed expected a readiness by Hungary and Poland to embrace the civic 
nationalism of WE. These accounts, by contrast, suggest that all post-communist CEE states 
would be interested in reclaiming their national identities after the experience of communism. 
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In addition to specifically complicating the nature of ethnicity and nationality, the 
experience of communism in CEE had the effect of homogenizing the populations of all post-
communist CEE states. To be sure, this was felt more sharply in the ethnically fragmented states, 
as ethnic hostilities between different groups were subordinated and repressed only to come 
immediately to the fore in the post-communist period. However it was at once readily 
experienced by the ethnically homogenous states. Katherine Verdery for one offers that the 
experience of communism had a homogenizing effect on all states of post-communist CEE that 
in each of them generated an “us”/”them” mentality, which she explains lent itself to ethnic 
antagonism by the ethnic majority against the regime.46 Further Verdery suggests a general 
relationship between national identities and “economies of shortage,” in turn suggesting the 
inevitable resurgence of nationalism in all of the formerly communist states.47  
Wolczuk and Yemelianova contend that this homogeneity was not only limited to the 
realm of ethno-cultural considerations but to ideological ones as well. They make this point 
rather eloquently, explaining that “communism could not and did not create the means of 
resolving the conflicts that derived from modernity—the normal contest of ideas, interests, 
institutions—because it insisted on a very high level of ideologically determined homogeneity 
and thus could not provide the cognitive and concrete instruments for resolving the problems of 
complexity it had created.”48 As such it seems that, given communism’s homogenizing nature, 
both directly in terms of the ethnic majority against the regime and furthermore for all citizens 
along ideological lines, all of the post-communist states would be characterized by ethnic 
nationalist moods once communist influence left the picture. As discussed, this affirms that 
                                               
46 Katherine Verdery, “Nationalism, Postsocialism, and Space in Eastern Europe,” Social Research 63, no. 
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Vachudova and Snyder were not incorrect to draw distinctions based on ethnic diversity per se. 
Indeed it makes sense that the ethnically fragmented states simply ruptured in the transition due 
to internal conflicts that had existed beneath the surface, while the homogenous states were able 
to move more steadily through democratization. But Vachudova and Snyder nonetheless failed to 
anticipate underlying trends aggravating nationalism, and this in turn explains why they missed 
that homogenous post-communist states would also inherit these sentiments and legacies, which 
in turn would complicate democratization efforts in the longer-run. 
Finally, nationalism of an ethnic character came to play such an outsize role in the 
developments of all post-communist CEE states because of a third factor, namely the absence of 
civil society as inherited from communism. Owing to the monopoly by communist regimes over 
institutions of civil society, post-communist politics were instantly characterized by a deep 
mistrust of such institutions and the elites in charge of them.49 Marc Howard argues that despite 
differentiation among the states of their experiences with communism, all of their politics went 
on to feature a hostility between the citizenry and the state’s political and economic elites 
(affirming this broader underlying trend).50 As discussed in section 2, this is why von Beyme 
argues that post-communist elites turned to nationalism of an ethno-cultural type in order to 
mobilize and reintegrate their states.51 Wolczuk and Yemelianova add to this point by 
demonstrating that post-communist elites jumped to ethnic nationalism as a replacement for the 
ideology of communism.52 While it seems likely that this was moreso the case in ethnically 
fragmented states (where the level of democracy consolidation was lower to begin with and 
which were characterized by weaker regime breakage) than in ethnically homogenous ones, it is 
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nevertheless true that the mobilization of ethno-cultural nationalism acted as a key social fabric 
for all post-communist CEE states.53 However this in turn placed a disproportionate level of 
importance on the role of ethnic nationalism where civic nationalism and institutions would 
normally play a unifying role, which, as we will see in section 4, would complicate democratic 
progress in its own right.54 
Perhaps obviously, Howard points to the weakness of civil life in post-communist states 
as dangerous to the health of those states’ democracies.55 He explains that while a weak civil life 
alone will not cause the crumbling of a state’s democracy, it nevertheless opens up a possibility 
for alternative political forces to take advantage of the system.56 Valerie Bunce further 
corroborates the notion that strong civil society is important to the health of any democratic 
system, shedding further light on the challenges faced in post-communist transition.57 In her 
account of democratization Bunce points to the role that institutions of civil society can play on 
constraining nationalism, which is as discussed mobilized by elites to consolidate their own 
power.58 This is because while civil society can be a point of organization against 
authoritarianism, nationalism by contrast has a demobilizing effect.59 While the extent to which 
civil society is a more or less useful tool for democracy consolidation is debated (i.e., some 
scholars of CEE believe in the specific value of ethno-cultural nationalism), it is clear that, for 
better or worse, all of the post-communist states had to deal with the legacy of ethno-cultural 
nationalism in their paths of democratization. This affirms the first point, namely that Vachudova 
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and Snyder missed the underlying historical trends motivating nationalist sentiments in post-
communist CEE. 
Even before considering its effects on nationalist sentiment in Hungary and Poland, we 
can reasonably conclude that communist occupation in particular damaged to some extent the 
chances of all of the post-communist states at becoming healthy democracies. We can agree that 
Vachudova and Snyder’s distinctions were correct insofar as their superficial distinctions 
between the two categories, but conclude further that the scholars ultimately missed systemic 
problems that would detriment the development of all of the states in the region. In turn we can 
draw similar conclusions about ethnic nationalism. Namely that communism aggravated 
nationalist sentiment in all of the post-communist CEE states, rather than just the ethnically 
fragmented ones. With this in mind, we can move on to a discussion of the specific nationalist 
traditions of Hungary and Poland to better understand their nature, and subsequent mobilizations, 
in the post-communist era. As mentioned what this investigation will not yet reveal is the 
relationship between ethnic nationalism and anti-democratic trends in the two states in 
consideration, a question to be resolved in section 4. 
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3.2. Hungary and Poland’s nationalist traditions 
In section 3.1 we concluded that the experience of communism had an overall ubiquitous 
effect on the states of post-communist CEE. In this section I will review the importance of the 
specific nationalist traditions of Hungary and Poland in order to demonstrate further Vachudova 
and Snyder’s error in failing to respond to them. These findings in turn suggest that Hungary and 
Poland are indeed rather similar, both in their experiences of communism and in their nationalist 
traditions generally. This at once affirms Vachudova and Snyder’s initial framework but in turn 
updates their misguided conclusions, with a renewed attention to the nature of that ever 
important variable, ethnic nationalism. 
 
3.2a. The Hungarian nationalist tradition 
As discussed, the experience of communism exacerbated nationalist tendencies across all 
of communist CEE, and so Hungary was readily affected by this as well. However Hungarian 
nationalism as a political tradition predates communism. The aim of this subsection, then, is to 
give a cursory overview of the Hungarian nationalist tradition in order to respond to Vachudova 
and Snyder’s overly ‘blind’ formulations about that state. 
We can begin to examine Hungary’s nationalist tradition in the context of its unique 
political and geographic circumstances. Judith Fai-Podlipnik explains that from their earliest 
settlement in Europe, the Magyar people were both linguistically and ethnically isolated on the 
European continent (by contrast, for instance, to the Slavs).60 Given their isolation, then, it 
follows that Hungarian nationalism developed with a heavy emphasis on blood ties and ingroup 
favoritism and as such would be defined along ethno-cultural lines. Another important factor 
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within Hungary’s nationalist tradition is its geopolitics. In characterizing the historical 
importance of ethnicity to the Hungarian notion of statehood, Will Kymlicka presents the view 
of the influential Hungarian political thinker István Bibó. Kymlicka writes that for Bibó, 
minority groups in Eastern Europe were viewed with extreme suspicion by regimes out of fear 
that they would secede and join forces with their co-ethnic neighbors.61 In this sense, then, the 
exclusive nature of Hungarian nationalism may have developed out of a need by Hungary to 
securitize in a turbulent political climate.  
In addition to Hungary’s geopolitical circumstances, there are a number of key historical 
events that inform the state’s nationalist tradition. However in considering these events, it is 
worth noting that myths regarding territory or conflict are meaningless as ends in themselves. 
That is, territorial transfers and conflicts in the time before late modernity had little consideration 
for mass populations; rather, they were decided by rulers and elite bodies.62 By contrast, the 
manner in which these historical events have been exploited by Hungarian leaders in more recent 
history helps shed light on the development of contemporary authoritarianism in a given state. 
To that end, Charles King demonstrates that nationalism has been used by Hungarian political 
elites consistently since at least the 19th century.63 He argues that while nationalism has been 
used for various ends and with varied degrees of success, that its repeated mobilization points to 
an overall importance in the Hungarian political imagination.64 In turn we can conclude that 
nationalism is indeed a very prevalent element of Hungarian political life.  
To that end Hungary’s nationalist tradition may in a sense be self-perpetuating. Lonnie 
Johnson explains that Hungary, like Poland and in contrast to Czechia, takes pride in its history 
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of national uprisings, and that this in turn should be anticipated by analyses of Hungarian 
politics.65 King adds that Hungarian nationalism was met with some success in 1867 during the 
Austro-Hungarian Compromise (as has, he writes, the nationalism of the present day).66 By 
contrast King considers the nationalist moments of the Hungarian Revolution of 1848 and the 
aftermath of the First World War in 1920 to have been failures of Hungarian nationalism.67 
Already, then, the development of Hungarian nationalism ought to be expected as a rather 
consistently available factor in Hungarian political life. 
As such we can turn to some of the specific historical factors motivating Hungarian 
nationalism. One of the main motivating factors of contemporary Hungarian nationalism is the 
legacy of the 1920 Treaty of Trianon following the Treaty of Versailles in 1919. In a sense the 
nationalist sentiment surrounding this loss of territory can be seen as analogous to Weimar 
Germany’s stab-in-the-back myth following the conclusion of the First World War.68 This treaty 
stripped Hungary of roughly two-thirds of its land and reduced its population by roughly two-
thirds in turn. Further the treaty deprived Hungary of key resources and access to the sea.69Jan-
Werner Mueller argues that the Treaty of Trianon continues to inform an irredentist, ethnically 
motivated conception of nationalism in Hungary to this day.70 Notably, as we will see, this event 
has been mobilized in recent Hungarian politics to justify irredentist claims. 
As for many states of the former Soviet Union, the experience of the Second World War 
reinforced the importance of ethnicity to Hungarian nationalism. While the Hungarians did not 
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embrace ethnic homogenization policies to the degree of the Poles for fear of retribution, neither 
were they resolutely opposed to this idea.71 At once it is worth considering the legacy of Miklós 
Horthy, Hungary’s leader during the Second World War and a onetime ally of Adolf Hitler.72 
Despite his rather unsavory history, the controversial figure’s memory has seen a revival in 
recent years.73 It follows that the legacy of the Second World War continues to motivate the 
Hungarian nationalist tradition along ethnic lines.  
The experience of communism, from the years of 1949 to 1989, further complicated and 
energized the role of ethno-cultural nationalism in Hungarian political life. As discussed in 
section 3.1, the experience of communism aggravated nationalist sentiments in all of the states of 
post-communist CEE. This came as a result of their heightened self-conceptions as ethnic nations 
rather than as communist republics.74 Given this, we can reasonably conclude that nationalism of 
an ethno-cultural type was instrumental in the Hungarian resistance to communism, and in turn 
has continued to inform the country’s political tradition in its post-communist period. 
In order to get a sense for the importance of kinship to the Hungarian resistance to 
communist occupation, we may examine a few case studies that speak to the function of ethno-
cultural sentiment in communist Hungary and the legacy this may have on contemporary 
Hungarian society. In his essay “The Extraordinary Career of Feketevágó Ur: Wood Theft, Pig 
Killing, and Entrepreneurship in Communist Hungary,” Karl Brown recounts the story of János 
S. and his illegal butchering business. Brown’s narrative focuses not on János S. specifically, but 
rather argues that his “individual activities were only the tip of the iceberg in his small town: 
everyone he knew, at all levels of the rural social hierarchy, was complicit in his and similar 
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schemes.”75 This willingness by János S.’ community to work together for their communal 
benefit and to the detriment of the regime signals an importance of kinship in Hungarian society, 
which, if anything, was tested and reinforced by the experience of communist occupation. 
Further, Brown’s account demonstrates how communist occupation exacerbated ethnic 
tensions in Hungary. In certain respects, communism not only strengthened ethnic sentiments 
among majority populations but isolated them even further from minority groups such as Roma 
gypsies. As Brown explains, Roma gypsies more than any other group had little incentive to 
collaborate against the regime, considering that communist rule had afforded them a level of 
preferential treatment, which felt rather welcome after centuries of persecution and ethnic 
cleansing.76 It follows that the communist precedent of (at least nominally) defending minority 
rights would reignite ethnic sentiments by Hungarians in light of EU accession, which also 
placed a heavy emphasis on the fair treatment of minorities. 
 Brown’s account, as well as that of Taras Dombos and Lena Pellandini-Simanyi in their 
essay “Kids, Cars, or Cashews? Debating and Remembering Consumption in Socialist Hungary,” 
both shed light on the connection between ethnic Hungarian kinship and subsequent economic 
reforms that took place in communist Hungary. In the same article, Brown points to economic 
practices such as the ones demonstrated by János S. and his community as instrumental to the 
eventual collapse of communism.77 This is all to say that following the unrest of Hungary’s 1956 
Uprising, many of the social and economic reforms undertaken by Eastern Bloc regimes simply 
entailed the legalization or semi-legalization of already existent economic practices.78 That these 
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laws were ultimately adopted during Hungary’s democratic transition suggests a kind of implicit 
kinship from the very foundations of post-communist Hungary, which continued to inform its 
political and economic developments. On the whole, then, it is clear that communism had a 
significant impact on Hungarian conceptions of ethnicity and kinship, which in turn influenced 
later conservative politics in Hungary as well as the state’s democratic transition on the whole. 
It is also instructive to consider the legacy of communist occupation on Hungarian social 
and political life, particularly in the period of time directly following the collapse of the Soviet 
Union. Wilkin points to the resilient trends of alcoholism and suicide among Hungarians, along 
with widespread discrimination against women, as well as the overall struggle to develop a civil 
society independent of the government.79 Additionally, Wilkin describes Hungarian politics in 
the immediate post-communist period as being characterized by a monopoly of left-liberal 
policies and a general embrace of neoliberalism by Hungarian elites.80 By contrast at this point 
the right-wing was rather bare, which represented the overall hindering nature of communism on 
transitional politics, and, as we will see, spelled danger for the health of Hungary’s democracy.  
This cursory review of Hungary’s nationalist tradition helps to further inform Vachudova 
and Snyder’s misguided assumptions about that state. This is to say that their expectation that 
Hungary, and ethnically homogenous states in general, would simply leap out of their communist 
legacies without any mobilization of their nationalist traditions was rather short-sighted indeed. 
An analogous review of Poland’s nationalist tradition will reveal the same. 
 
3.2b. The Polish nationalist tradition 
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Like Hungary, Poland has a rich nationalist tradition. As with Hungary, we can conduct 
our examination of contemporary nationalist developments in Poland by examining this tradition 
in context. In certain respects Poland’s ethno-cultural nationalist tradition has been more 
aggressive than Hungary’s, even. This first and foremost affirms that Poland, like Hungary, has a 
strong nationalist tradition, and second suggests that Vachudova and Snyder were shortsighted in 
failing to include it in their formulations. 
One of the most brazen examples of Poland’s nationalist tradition was demonstrated by 
the movement known as National Democracy (Narodowa Demokracja), or the Endeks 
(Endecja). This group rose to prominence in Poland following the end of the First World War, 
and their ideology was encapsulated by their slogan, “Poland for the Poles.”81 Cramsey and 
Wittenberg describe how the Endeks were remained of the most popular political factions for a 
number of years during the interwar period.82 They demonstrate further that the Endeks were one 
of the strongest forces in favor of polonization (i.e., forced cultural assimilation), which was 
mobilized toward the Slavic peoples to Poland’s East and South.83 Notably, polonization was not 
directed at Poland’s German or Jewish inhabitants, indicating a preference for homogeneity 
within the nationalist tradition.84 It follows that here we can begin to see the virulent 
undercurrents of ethnic homogeneity. 
 Poland’s homogenization efforts were more aggressive than those of Hungary or Czechia 
(or, for that matter, Romania). Contemporaneous with this was an internationalist discourse of 
the interwar period, largely emphasized by the victorious Western powers, which privileged the 
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rights of ethnic minorities.85 While Poland’s homogenization efforts became even more 
aggressive following the Second World War, in some sense the development of polonization 
strategies in the interwar period may have set a precedent for Polish disregard of directives from 
foreign bodies on the whole (such as the Soviet Union or the EU).86 The main geographic target 
of the polonization strategy were the kresy, an interwar territory that comprised parts of modern 
day Western Ukraine and Western Belarus.87 As we will see, the legacy of polonization and the 
nationalist tradition therein continues to complicate its political life. 
 Another example of extremism in the Polish nationalist tradition is the organization All-
Polish Youth. Citing this organization’s contemporary incarnation as an example of Poland’s 
resilient nationalism, Ewa Sidorenko writes that All-Polish Youth was one of the most militantly 
anti-Semitic organizations in Poland during the interwar period.88 Fox and Vermeersch add that 
the organization has a history of promoting extreme devotion to Catholicism and a commitment 
to an ethnically homogenous Poland.89  
As with Hungary, the experience of the Second World War forms a major part of 
Poland’s nationalist tradition. One of the most consequential events for contemporary Polish 
nationalism was the Katyń massacre, in which tens of thousands of Polish military officials were 
executed by the Soviet NKVD (Narodnyi Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del; KGB predecessor). 
Indeed this event not only serves as a key example of the Polish nationalist tradition but further 
illustrates how nationalist myths are manipulated by later generations of politicians. That is, 
despite (or more charitably for lack of knowledge of) the gruesome actions of the Soviet secret 
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police, the immediate post-war years were characterized by collaboration between Poland’s 
nationalists and communists (who were by all means an extension of the Soviet regime). 
Cramsey and Wittenberg explain that the Endek and brother of the Polish prime minister 
Stanisław Grabski collaborated with Josef Stalin and his ethnically Polish associate Wanda 
Wasilewska in order to achieve a more ethnically homogenous Polish state.90 At this point the 
Soviet regime had come to view homogenization favorably after encountering difficulties with 
minority politics, though the relationship between ethnicity and Soviet ideology would become 
more complicated during communist occupation of the Eastern Bloc.91 This again demonstrates 
the aggressive history of ethnic homogeneity in Poland, and further sheds light on the richness 
and complexity of the Polish nationalist tradition.  
As with our examination of Hungary, we can look to a case study of communist 
occupation for some insights into the effects it had on aggravating nationalist sentiment. In her 
essay “Keeping It Close To Home: Resourcefulness and Scarcity in Late Socialist and 
Postsocialist Poland,” Małgorzata Mazurek details the heightened importance of family ties that 
came about as a result of Poland’s economy of shortages (in turn calling to mind Verdery’s point 
about communist society generally).92 Mazurek demonstrates further that this was particularly 
evident during the Polish economic crisis of the late 1970s and early 1980s, during which the 
national economy thoroughly failed, and familial ties became more than ever critical to 
subsistence.93 Mazurek characterizes the socialization of trust in kin networks over the 
government: “[...] Having been thrown back on their own resources, Poles turned to their family 
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networks, which, contrary to the Party-state, remained trustworthy and efficient.”94 It follows 
from this account that, as demonstrated previously, communism had the effect of amplifying the 
culture of kinship reliance in Poland, which in turn would prove central to its political culture in 
the post-communist period.  
Poland’s experience of communism, then, along with the implications for its nationalist 
tradition therein, influenced its democratic transition in the years immediately following the 
collapse of the Soviet Union. Aleksandra Wyrozumska and Gerd Meyer illustrate the distance 
between attempts at reform by the government and holdover practices from communism among 
the general population, writing that “many informal, traditional, or even illegal practices [were] 
left intact.”95 Indeed M. Steven Fish points to the example of Poland’s Small Constitution, an 
intermediary document that attempted to mediate between the legislative and executive branches 
of its government, as well as with local governments across the newly democratic state, which he 
explains served as the country’s official constitution until 1997.96 Considering this in relation to 
King’s claim that “[the] institutional arrangements inherited from previous regimes and the 
decisions that policymakers take in the early years of systemic reform are crucial, [...],” we can 
reasonably conclude that the discord inherited from communism negatively impacted Poland’s 
democracy while at once aggravating its nationalist tradition.97 This in turn contradicts 
Vachudova and Snyder’s expectation that superficial factors alone would make for an 
unproblematic democratic transition. 
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To sum up, Poland, like Hungary, has a rich nationalist tradition, and Vachudova and 
Snyder were shortsighted in their failure to recognize it in lieu of seemingly favorable 
democratic conditions. As with Hungary, then, we can conclude that nationalism would come to 
play a decisive role in Poland’s post-communist politics, complicating its democratic progress in 
turn. 
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3.3. Conclusions on nationalism in post-communist CEE 
Following this review of their nationalist traditions, Hungary and Poland appear to be 
rather similar. I will affirm this point with several other key facts pertaining to their historical 
experiences, particularly in relation to each other. I will then tie these conclusions into a 
discussion of Vachudova and Snyder’s formulations on the whole.  
As mentioned, given this paper’s comparative aim, it will be instructive to consider 
Hungary’s relationship with Poland during the Second World War. In her paper “Hungary’s 
relationship with Poland and its refugees during World War II,” Fai-Podlipnik details the special 
treatment afforded by Hungary to Polish citizens throughout the war despite their formal military 
opposition to one another. She argues that the mutual respect between the two warring states was 
partly motivated by a shared legacy of Habsburg incorporation through the end of the First 
World War.98 Fai-Podlipnik rejects the notion that the mutual sympathy stemmed from the 
states’ shared Roman-Catholicism, given that Hungary’s clergy was distinctly sympathetic to the 
Nazis; however it seems possible that their shared religion could have at least animated positive 
feelings among their non-clerical citizens.99 Nevertheless it remains that the treatment of Poles 
by Hungarians was decidedly generous, as it included the freedom of speech and the general 
protection of Polish citizens by the Hungarian army.100 This of course contrasted sharply with 
both states’ vicious treatments of their Jewish populations, all of which is to say that even during 
the Second World War, a distinct political outlook was shared by Hungary and Poland despite 
the political differences at play.101 This in turn suggests a sameness to Hungarian and Polish 
political culture. 
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And while the experience of communist rule was ubiquitous to an extent, we must keep 
in mind that it was experienced to varying degrees. Tiemann characterizes the communist 
legacies of both Poland and Hungary as ‘national-accommodative’ (notably the only such two in 
his framework, to which he ascribes a 1.0 rating), a situation in which the regime was 
characterized by a weak state apparatus and governance structures as a result of its emergence 
from semi-democratic or authoritarian interwar polities.102 Herbert Kitschelt adds that in 
‘national-accommodative’ systems industrial class conflict was not as pronounced as the tension 
between urban elites and rural peasants, and that in turn the communist regime was hindered by 
the absence of a working class constituency.103 This was compounded by the presence of a 
doggedly independent church (which, as evidenced by Fai-Podlipnik, might already have been 
stronger in Poland than in Hungary).104 It is interesting then to note that, according to Tiemann’s 
framework, Romania and Bulgaria (in addition to Russia and Ukraine) are described as inheriting 
‘patrimonial’ communism (a 0.0 rating), which in turn suggests that underlying factors may have 
helped Vachudova and Snyder to explain the differences between those states on the one hand 
and Hungary and Poland on the other.105 Again this affirms the notion that Hungary and Poland 
were in a class of their own, but nonetheless a class that was subjected to communist rule. 
To conclude, given the aforementioned relationship between ethnicity as a mechanism of 
resistance and its mobilization against communist rule, it follows that at least some of Hungary 
and Poland’s post-communist incumbents would embrace an ethnic nationalist platform in 
advocating a move away from communism. Indeed Wolczuk and Yemelianova shed light on this 
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phenomenon: they argue that because Hungary and Poland were subjected to assimilationist 
strategies particularly strongly during communist occupation, their emergence as territorially 
intact states invited them to re-energize their nationalist traditions in a vigorous fashion.106 This 
again demonstrates both the importance of the nationalist tradition during the states’ democratic 
transitions, as well as the similarity between the two states insofar as their nationalist traditions 
are concerned. 
In turn, this overview of nationalism as relating to the historical experiences of both post-
communist CEE generally, and Hungary and Poland specifically, offers several useful 
conclusions in responding to Vachudova and Snyder. First, as discussed in section 3.1, the 
nationalist traditions of post-communist CEE ought to be considered to some extent as similar. 
This in turn helps to explain the later development of ethnic nationalism in both Hungary and 
Poland, like in Romania and Bulgaria, contrary to the predictions of Vachudova and Snyder. 
Second, as demonstrated in section 3.2, Hungary and Poland do indeed have distinct nationalist 
traditions, and, as we will see, Vachudova and Snyder’s failure to respond appropriately to them 
ultimately resulted in their paper’s subsequent inaccuracies. Third and relatedly, the nationalist 
traditions of Hungary and Poland are in point of fact especially similar, which in turn points us 
back to the integrity of Vachudova and Snyder’s framework. This is to say, then, that Vachudova 
and Snyder’s framework made local sense but failed to respond more generally to the political 
realities of the region. 
Finally, in turning to the experiences of Hungary and Poland over the past quarter-
century, we are tasked with responding to their divergent paths along the course of 
democratization. Their similarity prior to democratization in turn suggests the need for another 
variable in explaining the relationship between ethnic nationalism (a present factor, as 
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demonstrated) and anti-democratic trends (more pronounced in Hungary than in Poland, as we 
will see). This consideration brings us to section 4. 
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4. Another variable: pluralism on the right 
As we saw in section 3, contrary to the analysis of Vachudova and Snyder, both Hungary 
and Poland had vibrant ethnic nationalist traditions as they entered the post-communist period. In 
turning to contemporary developments in Hungary and Poland, we will see that none of the 
factors identified by Vachudova and Snyder as preventive of ethnic nationalism (ethnic 
homogeneity, strong economy, or a strong break from communism) stemmed the tide of ethnic 
nationalist sentiment in either of those states. However in at once attempting to explain the 
different courses of their democratic progress (or lack thereof), we must turn to another variable 
that better helps to characterize the situation in both states. The variable best suited for this, as I 
will argue, is the degree to which each country’s right-wing politics were characterized by a 
degree of pluralism.  
As we will see, while the condition of ethnic nationalism in Hungary and Poland was 
seemingly equivalent at the onset of democratization, Hungary’s conservative element was far 
less pluralistic than Poland’s at this time. This in turn facilitated the earlier and more successful 
rise of an authoritarian, personalistic politician in Hungary than in Poland. These conclusions at 
once affirm the importance of ethnic nationalism in stalling democratic progress but update it 
with a consideration for the role played by pluralism on the right. Namely, I will argue that 
ethnic nationalism is successfully mobilized in the post-communist CEE context toward anti-
democratic ends only in the condition of, and at once for the purpose of, consolidated political 
power on the right. 
This section will proceed first by discussing the course of politics in Hungary within the 
context of pluralism on the right. In so doing we will see how Viktor Orbán managed to drag 
Hungary down to Romania- and Bulgaria-levels of democracy by pursuing a two-fold strategy of 
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mobilizing ethnic nationalist sentiment and consolidating power on the right. I will then turn to 
an analogous discussion of Poland. In so doing I will first point to some controverting factors, 
which distinguish the plurality of its conservative element from that of Hungary, and will then 
track the course of Polish politics over the same period of time within that framework. Finally I 
will use the findings from these two cases in order to draw some conclusions about why Poland 
has not regressed as sharply as Hungary into authoritarianism. 
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4.1. Conservatism was the Viktor: the case of post-communist Hungary 
Political allegiances and ideologies in Hungary’s immediate post-communist period were 
ambiguous. However by all measures the left-wing was far more pluralistic than the right at this 
time. As such an analysis of Hungarian politics, and in turn an explanation of Viktor Orbán’s rise 
to political power through the lens of pluralism on the right, will reveal how ethnic nationalism 
was successfully mobilized toward anti-democratic ends in that state, and more generally how 
this is accomplished in the post-communist CEE context.  
This section will argue that because Hungary’s right was poorly represented during the 
immediate post-communist period to begin with, Orbán faced little competition in mobilizing 
ethnic nationalist rhetoric for his own political gains. The argument will proceed chronologically 
in order to demonstrate how Orbán accomplished this consolidation of power on the right over 
time. In turn the conclusions from this section will help to formulate a response to Vachudova 
and Snyder’s incomplete conclusions regarding the relationship between ethnic nationalism and 
anti-democratic trends in post-communist CEE. That is, the case of Hungary will show how 
ethnic nationalism poses a threat to democratic prospects only when coupled with a lack of 
pluralism on the right, rather than being a detrimental factor in itself. 
Vachudova and Snyder rightly characterized the immediate post-communist moment in 
Hungary as lacking an ethnic nationalist character but failed to anticipate later ethnic nationalist 
developments. As we will see, an analysis of this situation through the lens of pluralism of the 
right better explains both the absence of such rhetoric initially, as well as its subsequent re-
emergence and its use for anti-democratic ends. This in turn will better prepare us to analyze 
analogous developments in Poland. 
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4.1a. 1989-1998: The rise of Fidesz 
To begin, the scarcity of conservative political options during Hungary’s early period of 
democratization can be explained as an inheritance from the legacy of late communist rule. In the 
years leading up to its dissolution, Hungary’s communist regime undertook a number of political 
changes that in turn complicated and destabilized the politics of the immediate post-communist 
period. For one, the formal replacement of General Secretary Janos Kádár, who had been in 
power for 32 years, by the moderate Karóly Grósz in May 1988 signaled a liberal turn by the 
authoritarian regime.107 Grósz in turn was swiftly replaced by the even younger and more 
reform-minded Miklós Németh later that year.108 The appointment of Németh signaled an 
unprecedented embrace of liberalism by the regime, which complicated the efforts of the 
burgeoning liberal opposition to claim a distinct political position.109 Wilkin argues that the 
period of time between March and October 1989 was marked by a formal delegitimization of the 
old communist elite in favor of this newfound liberalism, which, as mentioned, was 
contemporaneous with the development of a separate liberal opposition.110 As such the 
incumbent regime, as well as its contender – altogether a sizable majority of the political 
landscape – were concentrated on one side of the ideological spectrum. 
In turn the lack of ethnic nationalist rhetoric in Hungary’s early post-communist years 
can be attributed to this conflict for supremacy on the left. This is because transitional politicians 
from the opposition were chiefly concerned with eradicating the influence of communism in 
favor of their liberal doctrine. Roman David explains that the most prolific lustration campaigns, 
aimed at eradicating all holdover influence from communist rule, were seen in Hungary, Poland, 
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and the Czech Republic.111 (This in turn suggests that the ethnically homogenous post-
communist states had more leverage to move past their communist legacies than their ethnically 
fragmented counterparts, to Vachudova and Snyder’s point.)  
It was in this political context that Orbán first began his political career as a university 
student in Budapest. At this time the young Orbán was a member of the liberal Democratic 
Opposition, a coalition between his Alliance of Young Democrats (Fiatal Demokraták 
Szövetsége, Fidesz) and the Alliance of Free Democrats (Szabad Demokraták Szövetsége, 
SZDSZ).112 Altogether this faction represented one of the three main groups present at the 
roundtable discussions that had brought an end to communist rule.113 As such, the Democratic 
Opposition’s ranks began their political careers above all else as foes of the communist regime 
and its continued influence in post-communist politics. 
That Orbán began his career as an opponent of communist ideology is noteworthy in 
analyzing his later consolidation of rhetoric and political power. That is, while he initially cast 
himself within the guise of young and progressive politics with the supposed aim of bettering 
Hungary’s democratic prospects, Orbán at once positioned himself ideologically as a defender of 
the Hungarian people against perceived outside threats. As we will see, this only became a 
problem for Hungary’s democratic prospects once Orbán was able to successfully shift his 
rhetoric to the poorly represented right. In so doing he was able to mobilize the same political 
strategy, albeit with an updated ideology, aimed not only at defending Hungarians from 
communist influence but from threats that were, generally speaking, ethno-cultural in nature. 
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By 1994 Fidesz appeared incapable of distinguishing itself within the diversity of 
political parties on the left. Dingsdale and Kovacs explain that in that year’s election there were 
140 political parties, 34 of which were able to field a candidate.114 The 1994 parliamentary 
election in turn saw the victory of the Hungarian Socialist Party (Magyar Szocialista Párt, 
MSZP) with a total of 54% of Hungary’s overall parliamentary seats and 149 of its 176 single-
member constituency seats, along with the second-place victory of the aforementioned SZDSZ 
with a total of 18% of the overall parliamentary seats and 16 of the 176 single-member 
constituency seats.115 This is particularly noteworthy given that these electoral results led to a 
coalition between the two victorious parties, in turn compounding the already prodigious 
representation of the left and at once representing a suspicious coalition between former 
communists and their onetime opposition.116 David adds that such a partnership failed to develop 
in both Poland and the Czech Republic.117  
Moreover, the 1994 election at once saw the drastic loss of the incumbent, center-right 
Hungarian Democratic Forum (Magyar Demokrata Fórum, MDF), which had prevailed in the 
1990 election and had at the time represented a coalition of conservative perspectives.118 
Dingsdale and Kovacs explain that the MDF’s loss in the 1994 election owed in large part to the 
dissatisfaction of the Hungarian electorate.119 At once, the other noteworthy conservative parties 
of the day performed rather poorly and as such remained altogether fringe in the scope of 
mainstream politics. The right-wing populist Independent Smallholders (Független Kisgazda, 
FKgP), for instance, garnered an unremarkable 8.8% of the popular vote (though admittedly 
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more impressive than Fidesz’ 7.02%), while the Christian Democratic People's Party 
(Kereszténydemokrata Néppárt, KDNP) garnered 7.02% and the far-right Hungarian Justice and 
Life Party (Magyar Igazság és Élet Pártja, MIÉP) failed to make it onto the map entirely.120 
Taken together, these political circumstances explain why in 1994 Hungary was characterized by 
a thoroughly enervated right, and further help inform Vachudova and Snyder’s 1997 conclusions 
about the lack of ethnic nationalist rhetoric in Hungary at the time. 
But at once this lack of pluralism of the right represented an ideal opportunity for an 
aspirant politician to claim its rhetoric. Fidesz, then, following its disappointing fifth-place 
performance in 1994, recast itself in the mid-1990s as a conservative party in order to gain 
greater political distinction.121 The shift was by all measures the project of Orbán. Bill Lomax 
argues that Orbán took motivation from the 1994 election results in part because his party’s poor 
performance was more reflective of strategic voting against the incumbent government rather 
than a rejection of Fidesz, or conservatism, as such.122 It follows that Orbán’s shift to the right 
was no accident, but rather an opportunistic strategy aimed at claiming its rhetoric in place of the 
discredited MDF – a strategy that paid off handsomely in 1998. 
In filling the vacuum of the right, Orbán not only co-opted its rhetoric but at once 
reshaped Hungarian politics on the whole. For one, Fidesz’ rise in the period leading up to the 
1998 election was facilitated by Orbán’s populist political style, which lent itself to an 
unprecedented personalization of Hungarian politics. András Bozóki and Eszter Simon argue that 
Orbán’s success in 1998 came in part from this ability to leverage his charismatic style, which he 
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used to differentiate himself from the majority of Hungarian politicians.123 Further, Bozóki and 
Simon describe how Orbán frequently employed wit and a degree of personal excitement in his 
public appearances, which in turn set him up for a personalistic style as an incumbent and at once 
demanded a corollary response from his competitors.124 All of this was further cemented by 
Orbán’s numerous appearances on media channels and his overall high personal visibility, which 
drew major attention to him alone in addition to his party and its platform.125 
Moreover, in the lead-up to the 1998 election Orbán was able to distinguish himself from 
his competitors by adopting a forward-looking vision of Hungary. By contrast most other 
Hungarian politics at the time had been known for focusing on the ills of Hungary’s past (i.e., the 
experience of communism).126 In so doing, Orbán further managed to put forward a progressive, 
though conservative, vision of Hungary in order to challenge the predominant post-communist 
ideology of neoliberalism. Bozóki and Simon describe this strategy as once again unprecedented 
in Hungary’s short history as a democratic state.127 It is here that we can begin to see the 
emergence of a coherent conservative ideology as tied to one distinct politician, which as 
demonstrated was facilitated by the lack of competition on the right.  
At the same time Orbán’s consolidation of the right in the years leading up to the 1998 
election coincided with a series of troubling developments for the incumbent government. For 
one the government under Gyula Horn was faced with an economic crisis almost immediately 
after taking office, and the situation worsened with the resignation of its finance minister, László 
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Békesi, in January 1995.128 Following this, the government turned toward the neoliberal strategy 
of shock therapy, which it adopted in the form of the Bokros package in 1996. Wilkin argues that 
an understanding of the Bokros package and the socioeconomic climate surrounding it is critical 
to an understanding of how Fidesz managed to come to power in 1998.129 The package enacted 
cuts in public spending, which in turn led to a decrease in living standards and a drop in real 
wages by 25%.130 This was followed by another crisis in September 1996 known as the “Tocsik 
Affair,” a graft allegation led by Fidesz against a lawyer affiliated with the incumbent 
government.131  
As such, as these developments unfolded, Fidesz was well positioned to reap the benefits 
of being the most prominent of Hungary’s conservative opposition and it readily took advantage 
of the opportunity. Much as the left had prevailed in 1994 subsequent to the failures of the 
center-right MDF government, in 1998 the pendulum would swing back in the favor of the other 
side of the ideological spectrum, and indeed this resulted in an electoral triumph for Fidesz. 
However one cannot fully understand Orbán’s 1998 victory without understanding the decisive 
role played by ethnic nationalism in his doing so. Indeed it was this variable, coupled with 
Fidesz’ unique political position, that handed the aspirant authoritarian his first major 
opportunity to consolidate power and reverse the course of Hungary’s democratization. 
In the lead-up to the 1998 election Fidesz took a relatively low-key approach and, indeed, 
in the first round came only in second to the incumbent MSZP (Socialists), garnering 29% of the 
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vote to their 33%.132 In turn, subsequent to the runoff neither Fidesz nor MSZP was successful in 
obtaining a constitutional majority. Lomax explains:  
[In] the final result [...] the Socialist Party still won five per cent more votes than 
were cast for Fidesz candidates standing alone together with Fidesz candidates 
standing on joint tickets with the Democratic Forum, but it won fewer individual 
constituencies (54 as against Fidesz’s 90). At the same time, a further 15 
Democratic Forum candidates were elected on joint tickets with Fidesz, in 
addition to two standing alone. Yet, with 165 seats altogether, Fidesz and the 
Democratic Forum did not have an overall majority, although they did have more 
seats than those of the Socialists and Free Democrats combined, at 158.133 
 
Lomax goes on to explain that, given the situation, Fidesz managed only able to obtain its 
constitutional majority after partnering with the aforementioned Independent Smallholders, who 
had obtained 48 parliamentary seats in their own right.134 Moreover the aforementioned Justice 
and Life Party, a far-right group by all measures, managed to garner a full 5% of the popular 
vote, along with a full 14 seats in parliament, in a shocking demonstration of the salience of 
ethnic nationalism.135 For their part Fidesz chose not to partner with the Justice and Life Party, 
but the results of the 1998 election remained clear: conservatism was the victor, and ethnic 
nationalism was decidedly relevant to Hungarian political life. 
 As such the stage was set. A partnership with the Smallholders (and in turn an embrace of 
ethnic nationalism) had proven the decisive factor in Fidesz’ first electoral victory. And Orbán’s 
centrality within this coalition altogether poised him to become the face of Hungary’s right. On 
the whole then we can conclude that Orbán’s two-fold strategy, first of personalizing politics in 
the lead-up to 1998, and second of consolidating conservative and ethnic nationalist rhetoric 
around his party’s constitutional majority, was an altogether successful one.  
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This in turn points us back to Vachudova and Snyder. At once we can conclude that 
Vachudova and Snyder were indeed mistaken not to anticipate the emergence and strategic 
importance of ethnic nationalism in Hungarian politics. Further, we can conclude that 
Vachudova and Snyder mischaracterized the relationship between ethnic nationalism as an end in 
itself with a given country’s democratic prospects, though in Vachudova and Snyder’s 
formulation this argument failed even to extend to Hungary. As we will see, the use of ethnic 
nationalist rhetoric for anti-democratic ends during Orbán’s first term was facilitated by way of 
his further consolidation of the right (i.e., a weakening of pluralism), not by a mobilization of the 
rhetoric on its own. This will prove important to our later examinations of analogous 
developments in Poland. 
 
4.1b. 1998-2002: Orbán’s consolidation of power during his first term 
Actions taken by Fidesz during their first term in office were plainly aimed at a 
consolidation of ethnic nationalist rhetoric on their own terms. As we will see, this was 
evidenced in part by Orbán’s manipulation of rhetoric during Hungary’s accession negotiations 
into the EU. Further, the parliamentary elections of 2002 demonstrate the extent to which Orbán 
was indeed successful in consolidating Hungary’s right after his first term in office. Finally, after 
reviewing these two points, we will turn to the actual impact of Orbán’s first term in office on 
the health of Hungarian democracy in order to assess his consolidation of power. 
The abuse by Orbán and Fidesz of EU ideology was put on full display during Hungary’s 
accession negotiations, which lasted from the start of Orbán’s first term in 1998 until the state’s 
accession in May 2004. In this vein, one of Orbán’s most controversial pieces of legislation came 
at a time when Hungary had already made significant progress in the process of accession. On 
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the face this provision, the  2001 Act on Hungarians Living in Neighboring Countries (otherwise 
known as the Status Law), aimed to ease the conditions for Hungarian co-ethnics (i.e., ethnic 
Hungarians in Hungary’s neighboring states) to work and study in Hungary.136 King, however, 
argues that this provision was in fact a clever manipulation of EU rhetoric by Orbán and Fidesz 
against the EU, on the EU’s own terms.137 This is to say that while the rhetoric surrounding the 
bill was couched in concern over the rights of ethnic minorities (an important tenet of the EU 
accession process), in reality it was intended to allow Hungary to assert an openly irredentist 
position on behalf of its co-ethnics in Slovakia and Romania.138  
The law’s aggressive undertone was not lost on Hungary’s neighbors. The Romanian 
government, for one, described the law as “contrary to the European spirit.”139 Yet the EU’s 
singular objection to Austria’s inclusion in the list of states included in the provision signaled a 
tacit acceptance of Fidesz’ actions in post-communist CEE, perhaps because the rhetoric 
regarding Hungarian co-ethnics was believably well-intentioned.140 Indeed King points to the 
precedent set by Article 15 of a 1996 accord between Hungary and Romania, the longest of all 
the document’s sections, which emphasized the mutual good treatment of their states’ minorities, 
as an example of Hungary’s widely-held positive democratic consolidation at the time.141 To be 
sure, without the benefit of hindsight it is reasonably clear why, not unlike Vachudova and 
Snyder, the EU would have given Hungary the benefit of the doubt. However with Orbán’s later 
career in mind, it follows that his mobilization of ethnic nationalist rhetoric, as evidenced by 
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irredentist provisions like the Status Law, was intentioned at tacitly and gradually consolidating 
his own power. 
On the whole then, Orbán managed to recast the ideology of EU accession, aimed at 
evolving Europe into a post-national body (recall the discussion of the ‘blind’ view of 
nationalism from section 2.2), into a referendum on Hungarian nationhood on his own terms.142 
This in turn allowed Orbán to co-opt the rhetoric regarding Hungary’s borders, which had proven 
so central to the state’s nationalist tradition ever since its devastating loss in the First World War 
(recall the discussion of the Treaty of Trianon from section 3.2b).143 Indeed Michael Stewart 
argues that by framing Hungarian accession into the EU as a reunification of Hungarian co-
ethnics, Orbán cleverly leveraged the guise of postmodern politics in order “to legitimize old-
fashioned, nationalist political goals,” and in turn augmented Hungary’s dominance within the 
CEE sphere.144 Jon E. Fox and Peter Vermeersch confirm that this legislation amounted to 
traditional irredentism in the guise of progressivist posturing, adding that in so doing, Orbán 
went on to advocate for a similar outlook on behalf of Hungary’s neighboring states.145 Fox and 
Vermeersch argue that this amounted to a hijacking of liberal democratic rhetoric from the EU, 
by Orbán, into an ethnic nationalist posture within the post-communist sphere that was aimed at 
the consolidation of his own power along nationalist lines.146  
Orbán’s cunning manipulation of EU rhetoric for anti-democratic ends offers an insight 
into Vachudova and Snyder’s misguided conclusions regarding Hungarian democratization. The 
contrast is further evidenced by Vachudova’s more recent article, “Democratization in 
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Postcommunist Europe.” Here Vachudova contends that the process of EU accession had the 
effect of liberalizing all of the post-communist states – even those, she argues, that had been 
plagued by illiberal rule subsequent to their early democratic transitions.147 Vachudova extends 
this line of reasoning to argue that the slow and oftentimes absent progress of illiberal post-
communist democracies became subsumed within the progressive power of EU accession, 
particularly because these negotiations often delegitimized corrupt and holdover incumbents by 
effectively “‘rewriting’ the rules of the game.”148 This seems a touch ironic given that, as 
demonstrated, it was Orbán who rewrote the terms of EU accession along the lines of his own 
political ambitions.  
As such, it seems what Vachudova again missed, and in turn what was missing from 
Vachudova and Snyder’s initial 1997 formulation, was a proper understanding of the role played 
by ethnic nationalism as it relates to anti-democratic trends. Instead, if analyzed through the lens 
of mobilization by Orbán of ethnic nationalist rhetoric aimed at a consolidation of his own 
power, Orbán’s actions in relation to EU accession make a good deal more sense given later 
developments than does the presumed liberalization in Vachudova’s more recent schema. We 
can thereby conclude that, contrary to Vachudova’s expectations, Orbán’s use of ethnic 
nationalist rhetoric during his first term in office helped him to consolidate his power over 
Hungary’s right to an unprecedented degree. That this was the case was further demonstrated by 
the results of the 2002 parliamentary elections. 
The results of Hungary’s 2002 parliamentary elections above all demonstrated the degree 
to which, in his first term, Orbán was able to take ownership over ethnic nationalist rhetoric and 
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as a result was able to fully consolidate power on the right. As discussed, in 1998 Fidesz had 
relied on the far-right FKgP in order to cement its constitutional majority. In so doing Fidesz had 
compounded their 148 parliamentary seats with FKgP’s 48 and  MDF’s 17 in order to 
successfully outweigh the incumbent MSZP’s total of 158 seats.149 And as discussed an 
additional, though unaffiliated, 14 seats from ultra-nationalist MIÉP had cemented the ethno-
nationalist mandate at the beginning of the Orbán’s first term.150 By contrast, by the first round 
of elections in 2002 both the FKgP and the MIÉP had all but been neutralized (from 13.2% to 
0.8%, and from 5.5% to 4.4% of the popular vote, respectively).151 By the second round, neither 
party was successful in garnering a single parliamentary seat or more than several hundred 
votes.152 As such Fidesz emerged the singular conservative party (the MDF had integrated), 
which in turn signaled an unprecedented accretion of power by Orbán over Hungary’s 
conserative politics. Pluralism on the right, then, had for all intents and purposes vanished from 
the picture. 
Given this consolidation on the right by Orbán and the continued primacy of the MSZP 
on the left, the 2002 election amounted to a two-party standoff. Fidesz campaigned largely on its 
record from the previous four years and, expecting a victory, was surprised at its rather narrow 
and unfavorable results in the first round.153 B. Fowler explains that the MSZP’s unexpected – 
though narrow – victory over Fidesz (42.1% of the regional list vote to Fidesz’ 41.1%) was due 
in large part to a collection of radical statements made by Fidesz politicians in the months 
leading up to the voting.154 The results of the second round were also remarkably close, with 
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Fidesz falling 6 seats short of an absolute majority,155 and gaining a total of 188 seats as 
compared to MSZP’s 197 (178 of its own in addition to 19 from the SZDSZ).156 It is ironic that, 
given Fidesz’ inability to form a coalition following the results of the second round, it was 
Orbán’s successful consolidation of the right that prevented him from winning re-election in 
2002. 
As suggested by Fowler, the 2002 election was noteworthy not only for the consolidation 
by Fidesz of the right, but also, in a manner characteristic of populist politics, a vitriol and 
divisiveness that had never before been seen in Hungary’s political culture. Ludolfo Paramio 
points to Orbán’s unrelenting criticism in the lead-up to the ballot of the liberal mayor of 
Budapest as a possible explanation for his poor electoral performance in that city in 2002.157 
Paramio goes on to tie Orbán’s openly vitriolic rhetoric in with his successful consolidation of 
the right, arguing that Orbán’s shift left few votes for him to win except from the center (i.e., 
from MSZP), or from a hypothetical coalition with MIÉP (hypothetical because MIÉP had failed 
to surpass the 5% threshold).158 Paramio goes on to argue against the possibility of the former 
situation because, as he explains, “Orbán’s campaign during the second round [took] a very 
different course and [adopted] more demagogic, nationalistic and anti-western tones, more fitting 
for the Party of Truth and Life (MIÉP) of István Csurka,” than, say, for a centrist aimed at 
stealing votes from the MSZP.159 Orbán, then, had by all means become the voice of right-wing 
nationalism to an unprecedented degree. 
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In sum Hungary’s 2002 election represented a litmus test of enormous importance for the 
young democracy. For one, the election featured a turnout that was unprecedented in Hungary’s 
existence as a post-communist state, with a full 73.5% of the electorate voting in the second 
round (according to figures from the Inter-Parliamentary Union),160 as compared to 57% in the 
1998 election.161 Further, following conciliatory remarks from the newly elected prime minister 
Péter Medgyessy, Orbán delivered one of his most infamous speeches, reproduced from Stewart: 
We have supported Hungarian culture to a degree not yet seen and we have begun 
the process of national reunification, so it is not, as you heard just now from the 
seat of another party, it is not that the future of Hungary lies in the 10 million 
Hungarians but in the 15 million Hungarian nation. Let me repeat, so that it can 
be heard everywhere where it should be heard: the future of Hungary lies not in 
the Hungary of 10 million but in the Hungarian nation of 15 million.162 
 
This excerpt of Orbán’s speech is noteworthy not least for his irredentist invocation of “the 
Hungarian nation of 15 million,” again pointing to the impressive degree of Orbán’s 
consolidation of ethnic nationalist rhetoric in his first term as prime minister. This, in addition to 
Orbán’s remarkably dogged commitment to “national reunification” despite having just lost 
formal power. And in addition to these bold-faced examples of irredentism, it was also during 
this speech that Orbán delivered his most infamous claim that, regardless of the results of the 
election, “the nation [could not] be in opposition.”163 Mueller rightly explains that this moment 
characterized the crystallization of Orbán as the sole representative of the Hungarian nation and 
its general will.164 And as we will see, this idea, along with Orbán’s continued consolidation of 
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power while in opposition, all served to both help Orbán’s influence and at once facilitate the 
continued erosion of Hungarian democracy. 
Finally, before moving to a discussion of Orbán’s continued consolidation of power 
during his years in opposition, it will be instructive to examine the actual erosion of Hungary’s 
democracy during Orbán’s first term in office. To begin, figures from V-Dem suggest that on the 
surface, Orbán’s first term in office did not have detrimental effects on the health of Hungary’s 
democracy during the period of 1998-2002, though neither did it improve it (its score hovered 
around 0.82 during Orbán’s term).165  
However qualitative accounts of Orbán’s first term go further to confirm that an anti-
democratic consolidation of power was indeed at play during this period, and further that, though 
it may not have influenced Hungary’s democracy at the time, this consolidation by Orbán in his 
first term did in fact lay the groundwork for subsequent authoritarian developments. Miklós 
Haraszti argues that despite his anti-communist posturing, Orbán undertook an “utterly 
nepotistic” governing style during his first term in office.166 Moreover, a 2006 report from the 
German non-profit Bertelsmann Foundation frames Orbán’s first term along lines that readily 
anticipate later authoritarian developments. It argues that in his first term, Orbán: 
[...] divided Hungary’s political elite and its citizens with his inability to 
compromise and cooperate and his unbridled ambition for power. He sidelined the 
parliament and, as part of this strategy to concentrate power, neutralized the 
institutional checks and balances that countered the executive branch. He served 
nationalist resentments and returned, at least in part, to a statist economic 
policy.167 
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The report from the Bertelsmann Foundation goes on to point to a regression in freedoms of 
expression, press, and the fight against corruption, and charges Fidesz with having “[poisoned] 
the public debate” by politicizing the Hungarian electorate and altogether creating rifts in a 
relatively unified society.168 The report’s claim regarding the unity of Hungarian society prior to 
Orbán’s accession calls to mind Vachudova and Snyder’s initial appraisals of democratic 
prospects in Hungary. Orbán in turn serves as an apt case study for how these conditions become 
undone.  
Further, it is clear from our examination of Orbán’s first term that during this period, his 
political ambitions and his ownership of ethnic nationalist rhetoric became inextricably linked. 
Fox and Vermeersch confirm that throughout his first term Orbán consistently framed political 
rhetoric along the lines of ethnic nationalism (as demonstrated in the prior discussion of EU 
accession), which in turn worked to position Orbán and his party as the spokespeople of the 
imagined Hungarian nation.169 This would rather obviously prove to be a problematic situation 
for democratic pluralism in Hungary. That is, in so doing Orbán cast politics as a struggle 
between himself as the defender of the Hungarian nation and those parties that, in his view, were 
not. Orbán continued to use this strategy, while at once maintaining his hold over the right, 
during his eight years in opposition. 
 
4.1c. 2002-2010: The nation in opposition and the rise of Jobbik 
As demonstrated in the previous section, Orbán’s first term in office set off anti-
democratic trends in Hungarian political life, and these trends were only further compounded 
during Fidesz’ eight years in opposition. As such the argument in this section will proceed in 
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four parts. First I will affirm the aforementioned claim by outlining the development of ethnic 
nationalist sentiments, as well as their beneficial implications for Orbán, during this period. I will 
then explain why, despite this, Orbán was unable to recapture incumbency in 2006 and how this 
related to a lack of pluralism on the right. Then I will outline the failures of incumbents that 
aided Orbán’s reelection in 2010. In this section I will also outline the contemporaneous rise of 
Jobbik, and the corollary move to the right by Hungarian politics on the whole. 
For many scholars Fidesz’ loss in the 2002 parliamentary election offered a comforting 
sign for Hungary’s democratic prospects. In their 2006 analysis Bozóki and Simon assert with 
full confidence that since initial democratization, Hungary had seen a full consolidation of 
democracy (Orbán’s term and all), and that if anything the rejection of Fidesz in 2002 signaled a 
healthy caution among the Hungarian electorate toward the dangers of authoritarianism.170 
Moreover, the aforementioned report from the Bertelsmann Foundation credits the MSZP 
government under Medgyessy with reversing many of the anti-democratic steps taken by Fidesz 
within months.171 Such appraisals call to mind Vachudova and Snyder’s optimism in assuming 
an inevitability to post-communist democratization. 
Of course not all accounts held that the damage of Orbán’s first term would be so easily 
undone. Adrian Basora, for one, wrote in 2008 about the disappointing reversal in the 
democratization trends of all of the Visegrád states (Hungary, Poland, Czechia and Slovakia).172 
Noting that these trends were running counter to predictions from the 1990s, Basora concludes 
that “after [an] initial sprint, the full consolidation of democracy is a much longer-term endeavor 
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and [...] the road can be quite bumpy.”173 Basora’s conclusions at once suggest that the effects of 
Orbán’s first term were felt in Hungary long after his leaving office in 2002, and further 
demonstrate that underlying factors, which earlier accounts like Vachudova and Snyder failed to 
anticipate, were contributing to democratic reversals across all of post-communist CEE. 
The continued deterioration of Hungarian democracy was reflected in certain aggregative 
reports. While as discussed the V-Dem account of Hungary failed to anticipate any changes in 
the health of its democracy during this period (with the exception of the year 2006, which will be 
discussed), figures from Freedom House seem to have captured the trend more clearly. For one, 
between the years 2003 and 2010 (i.e., Orbán’s time in opposition), Hungary’s democracy score 
rose steadily from 1.96 to 2.39 (see figure 4.1.1) (n.b.: Freedom House rankings follow a 1=best, 
7=worst scaling system).174 This trend was conceivably set in motion, at least in part, by the 
measures undertaken by Fidesz in their first term. 
In contrast to the aforementioned optimism of scholars like Bozóki and Simon, then, the 
gradual degeneration of democracy during Fidesz’ years in opposition was further compounded 
by a rise in ethnic nationalist sentiment among the Hungarian population. Indeed Wilkin points 
to the research of Zsuzsanna Vidra and the aforementioned Jon Fox, who demonstrate that 
between 2002 and 2009 far-right factions in Hungary (including neo-fascists) doubled in 
popularity.175 Wilkin explains further that during this period of time Hungary saw a rise in anti-
Roma propaganda as fueled by alleged “gypsy crimes,” and in turn because of the popularity of 
this messaging, more liberal-minded parties felt cautious in taking a stance against such rhetoric 
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for fear of losing votes.176 To be sure, given the closeness of the 2002 election, this appears to 
have been a rather unfortunate though necessary political strategy. Moreover Wilkin points to 
surveys from 2005, 2014, and 2015, all of which report over 50% of the Hungarian population as 
admitting to viewing Roma as especially predisposed to committing crimes.177 It is worth 
considering whether this alone controverts Vachudova and Snyder’s research design, given that 
Hungary’s relative ethnic homogeneity ultimately failed to immunize it from ethnic nationalist 
sentiment, both generally and specifically toward its meager Roma population. 
Further, Fidesz’ years in opposition saw the privileging by Hungarians of issues which 
typically lend themselves to authoritarian rhetoric rather than to liberal democracy. For one, 
despite their optimism Bozóki and Simon point to a poll from 2002 that demonstrated 72% of 
Hungarians as stating a preference for the state’s expending resources in order to fight crime 
rather than its defending human rights.178 In the same study respondents indicated a prioritization 
of issues of economics and nationalism over free speech and engagement in political life on the 
whole, signaling a salience of authoritarian-minded, ethnic nationalist ideas, as initiated by 
Orbán, over liberal democratic ones.179 This in turn was reflected in public opinion data, as 
demonstrated by Eurobarometer statistics. For instance between 2004-2009, sentiment about 
Hungary’s membership in the EU being a “good thing” fell from 49% to 32%, while in the same 
period sentiment about it being a “bad thing” rose from 10% to 22% (see figure 4.1.2).180  
As with the period of time between 1994-1998, political developments with incumbents 
during Orbán’s time in opposition only benefited and energized his commitment to reelection. 
First, after an unremarkable two years as prime minister, Medgyessy’s MSZP party met 
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substantial defeat to Fidesz in the 2004 European Parliamentary election, Hungary’s first (36.3% 
to Fidesz’ 47.2%).181 Several months later Medgyessy resigned after extensive in-party fighting 
and was unceremoniously replaced by his one-time associate Ferenc Gyurcsány.182 Such 
haphazard electoral transitions and party infighting perhaps hint at an early explanation of the 
sagging Freedom House numbers in the years 2006-on. 
However despite the turbulence within the MSZP, particularly given the closeness to the 
upcoming parliamentary elections, Fidesz was unhappily unable to secure a victory in 2006. An 
openly pro-Orbán editorial from The Economist predicted this, explaining that despite his 
“impeccable credentials,” Orbán would fail to win the allegiance of the SZDSZ and in turn 
would fail to obtain a constitutional majority.183 Umut Korkut adds that Fidesz’ failure was due 
in part to the party’s inability to produce a coherent program until shortly before the election.184 
This in turn was at least partly due to poorly-timed infighting between Fidesz and the MDF. 
Korkut explains that the collapsing MDF, which in previous elections had allied with Fidesz, 
chose to run on the slogan “We are adults” in an effort to delegitimize Orbán’s populist 
posturing.185 This development in turn affirms the controverting possibility of pluralism on the 
right for aspirant authoritarians like Orbán. 
Though despite the loss, the 2006 election brought a silver lining for Orbán and his party. 
First, Fidesz’ accumulation of 164 parliamentary seats (42.5% of the total) rendered the party 
still highly relevant and at once still the standard bearer of Hungary’s right (the collapsing MDF, 
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by contrast, obtained a meager 11 parliamentary seats, 2.9% of the total).186 Further, a report 
from the BBC on the 2006 election confirms describes that “[both] Fidesz and the Socialists have 
fought a campaign that has been very much personality-driven.”187 This can be read as an 
affirmation of the continued importance of personality politics to Hungary, by all means a strong 
suit for Orbán, as previously discussed. 
And despite setting a precedent by winning the first re-election in Hungary’s history as a 
post-communist state,188 the MSZP soon became embroiled in a scandal that damaged its 
political prospects irreversibly. Several months after Gyurcsány’s victory, a recording of the 
incumbent prime minister, in which he admitted to having lied to the Hungarian public in order 
to win that year’s election, leaked to the public and stirred a national controversy that culminated 
in demands for his resignation.189 Mueller explains that, while Gyurcsány managed to hold on to 
power until 2009, he and his party became severely morally discredited as a result.190 Mueller 
adds that, as previously discussed, the already suspicious alliance between the MSZP (the 
inheritors of the communist party) and the SZDSZ (their onetime liberal opposition) was brought 
under sharper scrutiny as a result of the leaks.191 To be sure, this thorough discrediting of the left 
would only serve Orbán in the coming elections. 
At once Fidesz’ years in opposition saw the formation of a younger and more aggressive 
ethnic nationalism, which dragged the tone of Hungary’s politics rather sharply to the right. Fox 
and Vermeersch explain that, starting in the mid-2000s, a far-right nationalist party by the name 
of The Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom, Jobbik) emerged 
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on the heels of the discredited MIÉP and in alliance with a paramilitary wing known as the 
Hungarian Guard (Magyar Garda).192 The younger, more extreme version of nationalism as 
embodied by Jobbik openly targeted ‘cosmopolitanism’ (Judaism) and endorsed acts of violence 
against Hungary’s Romani population, in addition to rejecting internationalist values and 
espousing an overall disinterest toward the decorum of mainstream politics.193 The rise in 
prominence of Jobbik, like the other aforementioned nationalist developments during Fidesz’ 
years in opposition, would figure prominently into Orbán’s landslide victory in Hungary’s 2010 
elections.  
In a sense, then, Hungary’s 2010 elections were the perfect storm. The election saw an 
unprecedented mobilization of ethnic nationalist rhetoric. Mueller, for instance, contends that 
Orbán and his party won on the basis of a deeply nationalistic campaign.194 Specifically Orbán 
achieved this by invoking, among other ideas, the nationalist legacy of the 1920 Treaty of 
Trianon (as discussed in section 3).195 At once the aforementioned controversy involving Prime 
Minister Gyurcsány, along with his resignation in March 2009, left the incumbent Socialists in a 
particularly weak position ahead of the election.196 And Eurobarometer statistics confirm the 
aforementioned salience of populist sentiment, a boon for Orbán. For one, in May 2010 17% of 
respondents reported ‘crime’ as one of the two most important issues facing the country, a 
marked spike from the 11.5% average of the previous two years (see figure 4.1.3).197 Altogether, 
then, the election resulted in an astonishing 99-seat pickup for Fidesz, along with a 131-seat drop 
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for MSZP and a 47-seat pickup for the nascent Jobbik.198 This in turn set the stage for an 
altogether unprecedented anti-democratic shift. 
 
4.1d. 2010-present: The crystallization of Orbán’s consolidation and conclusions 
Orbán’s reelection in 2010 marked an unprecedented crystallization of his power and 
control over ethnic nationalist sentiments. As we will see in this final section, since 2010 
Hungary has for all intents and purposes turned in an increasingly authoritarian direction. This 
situation controverts Vachudova and Snyder’s expectations about Hungary’s democratic 
prospects, and in turn suggests that they misunderstood the relationship between ethnic 
nationalism and anti-democratic developments. 
One of the most openly anti-democratic and controversial steps taken by Fidesz after its 
re-election in 2010 was its revision of the constitution. Orbán claimed that his party’s 
reformulation of the constitution was a legitimate act, given that the prior document had been 
based on a Stalinist constitution from 1949.199 Fidesz argued that in so doing, it was in fact 
breaking Hungary from its communist past, and that this move at once represented a mitigation 
against the consequences of its corrupt predecessor.200 As such this move amounted to a renewed 
mobilization by Fidesz against the communist bogeyman in an effort to legitimize its own anti-
democratic posturing. 
At once Fidesz took up its favored strategy of manipulating EU rhetoric in order to 
advance its own political gains. Mueller explains that, almost immediately after assuming office 
in 2010, Orbán instituted a Trianon memorial day and redefined Hungarian citizenship to include 
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co-ethnics in the Hungarian near abroad, all of which Mueller describes as having amounted to 
“nothing less than a comprehensive Kulturkampf.”201 Wilkinson argues that this was facilitated 
by an apparent disinterest in political matters by the EU. He points to the prioritization by the EU 
of economic measures such as the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) – a financial assistance 
program for eurozone members started in 2012 – and Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) – a 
financial mechanism launched by the European Central Bank in 2012 – which he argues signaled 
a tacit approval of Orbán’s nationalist posturing.202 Like Mueller, Wilkinson goes so far as to 
draw an analogy between Hungary’s actions and Weimar Germany,203 which if anything affirms 
that Hungary’s continued march toward authoritarianism was facilitated by an apparent apathy 
on the part of the EU. 
Further, Orbán’s return to power coincided with the continued salience of ethnic 
nationalist sentiment in Hungarian political life. Recent Freedom House reports suggest that 
Hungary is the fourth most prejudiced population in Europe, which seems to be in stark contrast 
to the expectations of Vachudova and Snyder.204 At once Fidesz and Jobbik have worked to 
revitalize the memory of the aforementioned Miklós Horthy, who oversaw some of the Jewish 
genocide of WWII.205 This development is further substantiated by Eurobarometer statistics. For 
one, in the two-year period between November 2014 and November 2016, negative sentiment 
toward immigration from outside of the EU jumped from 67% to 81%, while positive sentiment 
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fell from 28% to 15% (see figure 4.1.4).206 Additionally, the feeling that EU represented “not 
enough control at external borders” almost doubled from 12% to 23% (see figure 4.1.5).207 
Contemporaneous with the increased salience of ethnic nationalist after Orbán’s 
reelection in 2010 was the continued deterioration of Hungary’s democracy. Freedom House’s 
ranking of Hungary’s democracy score, for one, jumped from 2.39 to 3.29 in the period of time 
between 2010 and 2016, nearly matching Romania’s and even exceeding Bulgaria’s (see figure 
4.1.1).208 In another example, Hungary’s press freedom score rose from 23 to 40 in the period of 
time between 2010 and 2016, once again bringing it down to Romania-  and Bulgaria-levels of 
democratic health (see figure 4.1.6).209 Finally, in an example from V-Dem, Hungary’s political 
liberties rating fell from 0.91 in 2009 to 0.85 in 2012, again surpassing both Romania and 
Bulgaria (see figure 4.1.7).210 
All of the developments following Orbán’s 2010 re-election signal a seemingly 
irreversible trend of authoritarianism. Even the emergence of Jobbik, an ideological competitor, 
seems by all means to be within Orbán’s control. The findings from this section suggest, then, 
that the total reversal in Hungary’s democracy was first initiated by a lack of competition on the 
right and was compounded by Orbán’s mobilization of ethnic nationalist rhetoric in order to 
further consolidate his power. That this controverts Vachudova and Snyder’s formulations seems 
obvious given their expectations that Hungary would not see the development of any ethnic 
nationalism, and that this in turn would ensure its status as a healthy democracy. Finally, as we 
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turn to the case of Poland, we can keep these conclusions in mind as we attempt to explain the 
course and status of anti-democratic developments in that state. 
  
Golant 72 
4.2. A more pluralistic right: the case of post-communist Poland 
Given the central role played by the lack of pluralism on the right in facilitating Orbán’s 
consolidation of power, it is worth considering how Poland’s right differed in the immediate 
post-communist period, and continues to differ in the present day, from Hungary’s. As we will 
see, ethnic nationalism has also played an important role in Poland’s history as a post-communist 
state (as anticipated by section 3), but Poland has remained a qualitatively stronger democracy. 
In the view of this paper, then, the relative resilience of Poland’s democracy can be attributed to 
a greater degree of pluralism in its right. This situation in turn has presented a more difficult 
scenario for any one aspirant authoritarian to, in the manner of  Orbán, personalize or consolidate 
power on that side of the ideological spectrum. 
Upon review, it appears that Poland’s right is indeed characterized by several 
controverting factors that are not present in Hungary. I will begin by first reviewing some of 
these factors, including the prevalence of the Catholic Church and the relative universality of 
Poland’s nationalist myths. From here I will turn to a chronological overview of Poland’s 
political developments in order to provide further context for authoritarian developments in that 
state. As we will see, in the present day the condition of Poland’s democracy remains far 
stronger than Hungary’s. However an examination of the status of Poland’s right will help to 
better understand the actual danger posed by its recently elected populists. 
As mentioned, a significant difference between Poland and Hungary is the degree to 
which Poland’s Catholic Church, and the Polish population’s commitment to religion in general, 
is both stronger and more distinct from politics than in Hungary. This is plainly due to higher 
levels of atheism among Hungarians than Poles. Indeed according to the 2011 Hungarian census, 
39.0% of its population identified as Roman Catholic, with another 11.6% of its population 
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identifying as Reform.211 At once an additional 18.2% of Hungarians identified as not belonging 
to a religious community or congregation, with another 27.2% giving no answer.212 By contrast, 
Clare McManus-Czubińska and William Miller explain that Poland is widely considered to be 
the most religious country in Europe.213 Brian Porter adds that, as of 2007, “almost all Polish 
children (99%) are baptized into the Roman Catholic Church,” and further that “93% of all 
marriages are accompanied by a church wedding.”214  
Further, it is clear that religion remains a far more significant cultural practice for Poles 
than for Hungarians. Figures from the aforementioned Hungarian census indicate that the 
experience of communism seems to have secularized Hungary greatly: in contrast to the low 
indication of religious affiliation in 2011, the Hungarian census from 1949 (i.e., at the onset of 
communist rule) reported a full 70.5% of Hungarians identifying as Catholic, with another 21.9% 
as Reform and 5.2% as Evangelical.215 By contrast, in pointing to figures from the 2005 Polish 
National Election Study, McManus-Czubińska and Miller explain that in 2005 88% of Poles 
identified as considering themselves “believers” on some level.216 Of this group, 11% reported 
themselves to be devout; and the vast majority of this group in turn indicated attending religious 
services at least once a week.217 From here we can already conclude that, despite their similar 
experiences of communism, Poland emerged with a continued commitment to its religious 
tradition while Hungary’s religiosity appears to have waned over the same period. 
                                               
211 Hungarian Central Statistical Office, Census 2011 (Budapest, 2011), 
http://www.ksh.hu/nepszamlalas/tablak_teruleti_00 (accessed February 25, 2017). 
212 Hungarian Central Statistical Office, Census 2011 (accessed February 25, 2017). 
213 Clare McManus-Czubińska and William Miller, “European civilisation or European civilisations: the 
EU as a ‘Christian club’? Public opinion in Poland 2005,” in Reinventing Poland, eds. Martin Myant and Terry Cox 
(New York: Routledge, 2008): 130. 
214 Brian Porter, “Catholic Church in Poland: Introduction” (Fairfax: George Mason University, 2007), 
https://chnm.gmu.edu/1989/exhibits/roman-catholic-church/introduction (accessed March 22, 2017). 
215 Hungarian Central Statistical Office, Census 1949 (Budapest, 1949), 
http://www.ksh.hu/nepszamlalas/docs/tablak/teruleti/00/00_1_1_7_1.xls (accessed February 25, 2017). 
216 McManus-Czubińska and Miller, “European civilisation or European civilisations,” 130. 
217 McManus-Czubińska and Miller, “European civilisation or European civilisations,” 130. 
Golant 74 
Given the continued importance of the Catholic Church in Poland, it follows that religion 
and ethnic nationalism ought to be seen, at least in part, as distinct rhetorical forces in Poland’s 
right-wing politics. This in turn suggests that the politics of the right are more pluralistic in 
Poland than in Hungary. To that end, in her study on ethnic and religious tolerance in Poland in 
the mid-2000s, Ewa Gołębiowska affirms that ethnic and religious tolerance among Poles ought 
to be viewed as distinct.218 Of her many findings, Gołębiowska concludes that “overall levels of 
ethnic tolerance are higher than those of religious tolerance,” giving the example that while 
34.0% and 35.5% of those surveyed expressed some form of opposition to their children 
marrying someone with a Chinese or Jewish nationality, respectively, a full 55.2% and 47.9% 
expressed the same opinion about marriage to people of the Muslim and Jewish faith, 
respectively.219 McManus-Czubińska and Miller’s findings inform this point as well, 
demonstrating that religiosity among Poles correlates strongly with feelings of nationalism. They 
point to survey data showing 41% of agnostics and nonbelievers as claiming to be ‘proud’ of 
their Polish citizenship, as compared to 73% of those who are devout.220 All of these points 
suggest that aspirant authoritarians in Poland aiming to consolidate the right through ethnically-
motivated politics would be faced at once with co-opting the rhetoric of the Church, an 
additional barrier and in turn a pluralizing factor for Poland’s right-wing politics. 
Relatedly, Poland’s experience of communist resistance was a national struggle that 
universalized right-wing ideas, both through the Catholic Church as well as the Solidarity 
movement – something that did not occur in Hungary. Indeed, in contrasting the Polish 
experience of resistance to communism to that of Hungary, Wilkin writes that “[the] process in 
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Hungary was less a triumph of pressure from civil society, as was the case in Poland under the 
direction of Solidarity, than it was the outcome of intra-elite negotiations.”221 Sidorenko adds 
that during late communism Polish myths, traditions, and the private sphere on the whole became 
fronts of political struggle against the regime.222 This trend was also true of the Catholic Church. 
Brian Porter affirms the central role played by the Church during the 1980s in Poland’s 
resistance to communism, pointing specifically to the influence of Pope John Paul II (formerly 
Cardinal Karol Wojtyła of Kraków), whom he describes as being seen to have “[played] the key 
role in toppling Communism.”223  
While the legacy of communist resistance in Poland’s post-communist politics will be 
discussed at greater length, through these examples it is already clear how the universality of 
resistance mechanisms to all Poles would present a challenge for aspirant authoritarians in a 
manner not seen in Hungary. This owed particularly to the fact that the experience of resistance 
to communism played an outsize role in unifying Polish society across the aisle. Sidorenko 
explains that while Polish nationalism was multifaceted and fragmentary during the late 
communist period, the resistance movement was able to consolidate this mood into one 
overarching notion of Poles as a homogenous community of people over any distinct group or 
individual identities.224 Further, that this movement belonged to the public rather than 
representing any elite interests (as Wilkin indicates) gives an insight into the more pluralistic 
nature of Poland’s political landscape in the immediate post-communist period as compared to 
that of Hungary. To be sure, none of these factors controverted or stifled ethnic nationalism 
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entirely (as we will see), but they did at once present additional roadblocks that would later stall 
the development of right-wing authoritarianism. 
As we move to an analysis of the course of Polish politics in the post-communist period, 
we already have a sense for the ways in which Poland’s right-wing politics were more pluralistic 
than that of Hungary during its initial democratization. With this variable in mind, we can move 
on to an assessment of aspirant right-wing authoritarianism in Polish politics over the last 
quarter-century and draw conclusions about its relative successes and failures accordingly. 
 
4.2a. 1989-1997: Right-wing pluralism during Poland’s early democratization 
 As discussed, Poland’s political landscape was characterized by a greater degree of 
pluralism on the right than was Hungary’s. However this alone did not immunize it from ethnic 
nationalist sentiments, nor from politicians aimed at using such rhetoric for their own ends. In 
this section I will first discuss the reemergence of ethnic nationalist sentiment following Poland’s 
democratization. Then I will describe the co-opting of this rhetoric by Lech Wałęsa during his 
presidency, as well as his implications for pluralism on the right. Then I will turn to Poland’s 
experience of lustration and examine implications accordingly. Finally I will turn to the election 
of 1997 to examine the status of the right at that time. 
As the findings from section 3 suggested, Poland’s initial period of democratization saw 
the resurgence of its nationalist tradition almost instantly. Carl Tighe details the development and 
nature of extremist nationalism during this period: 
In an atmosphere where everything that had been suppressed for years was now 
possible, it was not unusual to see gangs of skinheads, sometimes carrying Nazi 
flags, roaming the streets of Warsaw and Kraków chanting ‘Polska dla polaków’ 
(Poland for Poles), to see anti-Semitic graffiti, and for people to wear ‘Chrobry’ 
sword-pins in their lapel, the symbol of the pre-war right-wing Endejca (National 
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Democracy) Party. This reactive and very substantial move to the right affected 
the conduct of the whole political spectrum.225 
 
If anything, Tighe’s account undermines the formulations of Vachudova and Snyder regarding 
the absence of an ethnic nationalism in Poland, though it seems this point has been sufficiently 
argued. Further, Tighe goes on to explain that Polish democratization was quickly hindered by 
the failure of the Solidarity movement leadership to produce a program past its original 
opposition to communist rule.226 Taken together, all of this suggests that despite the higher 
degree of pluralism in Polish political life at the onset, ethnic nationalist rhetoric would 
nevertheless go on to play a salient role in Polish political life, both due to its historical precedent 
as well as a result of subsequent political complications. 
 The salience of ethnic nationalist rhetoric in Polish political life, in turn, points us back to 
the similarities in the Polish and Hungarian cases. To that end, Wyrozumska and Meyer explain 
that part of the resilient tension in Polish politics at the onset of democratization was due to a 
competition between two overarching groups, which they term “Catholic-conservative-
nationalists” and “secular-socialist-internationalists.”227 This feature of Polish politics affirms, as 
we have seen several times, Vachudova and Snyder’s initial categorization of Hungary and 
Poland as politically similar. It further suggests that as with Hungary, aspirant authoritarians in 
Poland would proceed by attempting to consolidate their support within the former category of 
“Catholic-conservative-nationalists” through the use of ethnic nationalist rhetoric. This, then, 
points us back to the variable of pluralism on the right. 
 One important example for pluralism on the right from this early period is the presidency 
of  Lech Wałęsa, the legendary labor activist and co-founder of the Solidarity movement. 
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Wałęsa, at one time a beloved national figure who served as the second president of Poland from 
1990 to 1995, became widely known during his time in office for an embrace of openly hostile 
rhetoric toward intellectuals, communists, and Jews.228 Tighe explains that Wałęsa’s political 
style involved an ultimately unpopular, populist “war at the top,” which he used to criticize 
former Solidarity colleagues Bronisław Geremek and Adam Michnik for their Judaism and by 
contrast to distinguish himself as a blue-blooded Pole.229 It follows that Wałęsa’s hostile 
instigations against his former colleagues (the aforementioned, along with Jacek Kuroń), 
motivated by charges of communist conspiracy in addition to Judaism, would serve to fragment 
the very legacy of the movement that had united Poland to begin with. While this at once  
Fragmentation of this nature could spur polarization and heightened tensions in turn. 
 While at once such an escalation could have heightened tensions and spurred 
polarization, Wałęsa’s fragmentary style was put to rest by his loss in the 1995 presidential 
election. Donald Pienkos attributes the rejection of Wałęsa in 1995 to his aforementioned brash 
and unpleasant political style, which by this point had become “a source of unbridgeable division 
in the anti-Kwasniewski camp.”230 At once, however, Wałęsa’s loss seems to have been a 
positive force for pluralism on the right in Poland. That is, while as discussed the corollary 
incumbent party in Hungary, the MDF, allied with Fidesz after its loss in 1994 only to become 
politically irrelevant in later years, Wałęsa’s personalistic use of populist, ethnic nationalist 
rhetoric would only present a challenge to later aspirants such as the Kaczyński brothers. Indeed, 
while Wałęsa’s standing in Polish political life has diminished greatly over the past two decades, 
he has in more recent years drawn significant attention for his prolific criticism of the 
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Kaczyńskis and their party, PiS. For instance, as recently as in December 2016, Wałęsa 
excoriated PiS’ political ambitions in a Politico article titled “Throw Poland out of the EU.”231 
Wałęsa, then, appears an apt example of a stifling pluralism among Poland’s right that failed to 
emerge in Hungary. 
 Another important example for this discussion of pluralism, and in turn for the differing 
experiences of Hungary and Poland, is the legacy of lustration in Poland. Poland’s initial 
lustration campaigns, which were the most thorough in post-communist CEE and which 
coincided with the presidency of Wałęsa, were by all means a net negative for its democracy. 
David explains that of the three post-communist states who undertook lustration, “Poland was 
seen as a leader in public confessions, which was the method of its lustration system. But even in 
Poland, the results were still in negative values.”232 Tighe adds that, if anything, lustration 
undermined the public’s overall faith in politics, and with it their faith in all parties, rather than 
any one faction such as the unsavory MSZP-SZDSZ coalition in Hungary.233 In turn, Tighe 
explains, the process of lustration reinforced only the notion that any semblance of justice 
regarding communist rule was a nonstarter.234 We will see how its later mobilization proved 
unsuccessful in the Kaczyńskis’ attempts to mobilize nationalist rhetoric once in office. 
 In the meantime, one final component of the lustration campaigns worth noting for its 
detrimental effects on Polish democracy is the infamous Macierewicz List. From the beginning 
of the post-communist period Antoni Macierewicz, who served as Poland’s Minister of Internal 
Affairs from 1991-1992, was seen as one of the most incendiary far-right populists in Polish 
political life. Macierewicz stirred controversy in June 1992 when he published the 
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aforementioned list, which entailed 64 names of politicians in the Polish Sejm whom he alleged 
as having served as communist informants.235 The list culminated in a vote of no confidence for 
the incumbent government, then led by the aforementioned Wałęsa, and Macierewicz’ ultimate 
dismissal from office.236 One final point worth mentioning is that the controversial and then 
discredited Macierewicz was appointed as Poland’s Minister of Defense following PiS’ 2015 
electoral victory. If anything, then, we can conclude that the experience of lustration had the 
effect of making dubious the favored populist tradition of communist witch-hunts, which in turn 
delegitimized later such efforts. Taken together, all of this suggests a greater difficulty for 
aspirant authoritarians in Poland than in Hungary to co-opt sentiment regarding communist rule. 
 Finally, the circumstances of Poland’s 1997 parliamentary elections, as well as the 
constitutional referendum that preceded them, will provide another example of the condition of 
pluralism on the right during Poland’s early democratization. Aleks Szczerbiak explains that the 
most salient outcome of this election was what he terms “the spectacular and victorious ‘return’ 
of the Polish right.”237 Szczerbiak clarifies that this was not so much a return but rather a 
consolidation among right-wing parties into a functional, ruling parliamentary coalition in the 
name of Solidarity Electoral Action (Akcja Wyborcza Solidarność,, AWS).238 Szczerbiak’s 
analysis, which was published in 1998, details with optimism the pragmatic, de-personalized 
nature of AWS’ 1997 campaign, and characterizes its use of traditionalism and nostalgia as an 
appropriate, forward-looking vision for Polish politics.239 Fox and Vermeersch’s 2010 account, 
by contrast, describes AWS’ rhetoric as openly nationalistic and aimed at casting their main 
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opponents, the incumbent Democratic Left Alliance (Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej, SLD) as 
“un-Polish” (a strategy reminiscent of Orbán, particularly after his 2002 loss).240  
 As suggested, the nationalist mood surrounding the 1997 parliamentary elections was 
compounded by a referendum on the Polish constitution held several months prior, which would 
be the first such formal document in Poland’s history. This new, mature document was intended 
the replace Poland’s transitional ‘Small Constitution,’ which had been in place since 1992.241 
Jacek Kurczewski explains that one of the dominant sentiments among Polish politicians 
regarding this document at the time was an interest in diminishing the powers of the presidency, 
largely in response to the perceived populist excesses of Wałęsa.242 Kurczewski highlights a 
paradox within this document, namely that while it was seen as a mature and perceptive text that 
would respond to Poland’s political realities, at once this document came well after political 
norms, both for politicians and for the public, had become entrenched.243 This calls to mind 
Wasilewski’s description of Polish politicians as “institutional nomads,” who viewed the 
institutions of Polish democracy as means for their own political goals rather than as ends in 
themselves.244 
 As such, Poland’s initial post-communist period was characterized by a healthy degree of 
competition on the right. That this competition was at once highly personalistic and later 
discredited (e.g., as with the cases of Wałęsa and Macierewicz) indicated that the excesses of 
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Poland’s conservative element were being kept sufficiently in check. However the subsequent 
collapse of the AWS and in turn the rise of PiS tells a different story, as we will see. 
  
4.2b. 1997-2005: The death of AWS and the birth of PiS 
 The AWS’ term in office resulted in its collapse. While the mechanics of this 
development are not exactly relevant to the scope of this paper, I will begin by briefly explaining 
the context for this event. I will then explain how, more relevantly, the collapse of the AWS and 
the subsequent polarization of Polish political life therein led to the creation and eventual success 
of PiS. Following this I will detail PiS’ mobilization of nationalist rhetoric in the lead-up to 
Poland’s 2005 parliamentary elections. Finally I will discuss the results of this election, as well 
as its implications for the status of the right in Poland. 
 As suggested, PiS’ rise to power on the right was aided by the collapse of the incumbent 
AWS after its first term in office. Fox and Vermeersch explain that the AWS’ collapse was due 
in part to a series of corruption scandals that unfolded while the party held office.245 Indeed, in 
the lead-up to the election, the Economist reported the resignation of three ministers following 
corruption scandals in July of that year.246 Szczerbiak adds that “[at] the heart of the 
government’s problems was the AWS’s disparate internal structure, which meant that it could 
not always rely on its own parliamentary deputies to support government-sponsored 
legislation.”247 This is to say that the conservative coalition was ultimately unsuccessful in 
consolidating the various factions of Poland’s right, which in turn led to its failure as a party. 
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 As such this collapse of the AWS coalition, along with the ensuing reorganization of 
political factions among Poland’s right, gave birth to PiS. Fox and Vermeersch explain that, 
following the collapse of the AWS, Poland’s right-wing factions essentially split into two 
branches: the more moderate Civic Platform (Platforma Obywatelska, PO) and the nationalist 
PiS.248 Szczerbiak explains that while PiS on its own had performed rather poorly in the 2001 
election (obtaining only 44 parliamentary seats and 9.5% of the popular vote), the political 
context nevertheless ensured that “the PiS [had] emerged as the largest right-wing grouping in 
the new parliament.”249 As such the Kaczyńskis were poised to begin their consolidation of the 
right. 
 The story of PiS is an interesting one. The twin brothers and former child stars Lech and 
Jarosław Kaczyński founded their party in 2001 after careers spent working for the 
aforementioned Lech Wałęsa (and later splitting over numerous disagreements) as well as for 
another conservative, Jan Olszewski.250 Throughout their political careers, the Kaczyńskis had 
developed reputations for being openly and unapologetically nationalist. In one example this 
characteristic dates as far back as 1989, when Lech attempted to reintroduce discussions of the 
Katyń massacre into the Polish education system.251 As such the Kaczyńskis can perhaps be seen 
as comparable to Orbán in their (albeit more) gradual accretion of influence and control of 
Poland’s right-wing. 
 Almost instantly PiS came to represent an indignant and nativist populism within 
Poland’s broader conservative landscape. To this end James Traub characterizes the Kaczyński 
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brothers as reflecting Poland’s underlying conservative nature, writing of their rise that “Poland, 
in short, was less liberal than it looked from the outside.”252 And from the beginning, PiS’ 
rhetoric was characterized by populist allusions to Nazi ties among incumbent politicians such as 
Donald Tusk, along with claims that support for abortion or same-sex marriage were “un-Polish” 
viewpoints.253 Moreover, given its opposition during Poland’s accession into the EU, PiS was 
able to espouse a ‘eurosceptic’ view without having to take responsibility for any unfavorable 
aspects of the negotiations.254 Altogether, then, PiS’ early years in opposition gave the 
Kaczyńskis an early opportunity to consolidate their party’s power on the right. 
 In addition to mobilizing conservative rhetoric of a political type, the Kaczyńskis quickly 
worked to take ownership over socially conservative rhetoric as well. Indeed one of the main 
currents that runs through Polish traditionalism is homophobia, perhaps as tied to the country’s 
religiosity, and the Kaczyńskis in turn have a prolific record of homophobia. For Lech 
specifically this included attempting to pass laws barring homosexual teachers from working, 
along with actual bans on the Warsaw Gay Pride parade in 2004 and 2005, during his term as 
mayor of the city.255 Notably Lech’s latter move culminated in a pugnacious five-day standoff 
between the city government and its gay population at a ‘queer’ club called Le Madame.256 
However given that Lech’s next immediate political move was to become the president of Poland 
in 2005, such traditionalist posturing should certainly be read as motivated to broader ends. 
 Moreover, PiS’ relationship with the ultra-nationalist Catholic radio station Radio Maryja 
demonstrates their attempts at consolidating the religious aspect of Poland’s right. Radio Maryja 
was founded ten years prior to PiS in 1991 and swelled dramatically in its listenership 
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throughout the 1990s. Fox and Vermeersch point to a figure from 1998 in which Radio Maryja 
reported a consistent listenership of over four million Poles.257 As mentioned, the station is 
known for its far-right views on social and political affairs, and at once it has developed a 
reputation for its advocacy of the most right-wing candidates.258 Kate Connolly explains that this 
in turn translated into a tacit support of PiS, and at once instigated a rebuke of PiS by Poland’s 
chief rabbi for its endorsement of anti-Semitic views in turn.259 While during this period Radio 
Maryja remained far from a wholesale advocate of PiS, its embrace of the party does reflect the 
degree to which the Kaczyńskis attempted to, and successfully did, co-opt religious rhetoric. 
 PiS’ consolidation of conservative rhetoric, whether social, religious, or political, paid off 
in Poland’s 2005 parliamentary elections. PiS, having secured 49 seats in the senate (out of 100 
total)260 came in first place and in turn secured the presidency for Lech Kaczyński.261 PiS moved 
to consolidate power on the right by partnering with the far-right League of Polish Families 
(Liga Polskich Rodzin, LPR), headed by extremist Roman Giertych, along with Self Defence 
(Samoobrona Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej, SRP), headed by Andrzej Lepper, in order to form a 
constitutional majority.262 At once PiS’ victory came at the expense of their predecessors, the 
SLD, against whom PiS had mobilized a deeply controversial and scandalous campaign.263 
Following this consolidation of power on the right, PiS and the Kaczyńskis were situated to 
begin a formal consolidation of power in office. 
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4.2c. 2005-2007: The initial rise and fall of PiS 
 PiS’ first experience in office resulted in an at best ambivalent consolidation of power on 
the right.  While the Kaczyńskis were successful in taking ownership of nationalist rhetoric as 
pertained to the EU, on different points they encountered resistance from Poland’s other 
conservative stakeholders. This was evidenced both through their attempts to renew lustration as 
well as to co-opt rhetoric around the release of a film with nationalist undercurrents. After 
examining these points, I will move on to an assessment of PiS’ standing in relation to Poland’s 
right following the 2007 parliamentary elections and draw conclusions accordingly. 
 Similarly to Orbán, after assuming power in 2005 PiS began to express an openly anti-
EU sentiment. In one example from an EU summit in June 2007, the Kaczyński brothers drew 
headlines after they demanded increased voting rights for Poland in the EU Parliament in the 
amount of 6 million people, to make up for the number of Polish lives lost in the Second World 
War.264 Connolly explains that such posturing thoroughly undermined the EU decorum of not 
speaking about the Second World War, and adds that while the comments may have lost the 
Kaczyńskis a number of friends abroad, they likely cemented their support among their base.265 
Indeed, a contemporaneous article from Der Spiegel quoted the historian Peter Oliver Loew, who 
explained that the Kaczyńskis’ actions on the European stage were aimed at exploiting divisions 
within Polish society against a “shapeless” enemy, which in turn was aimed toward a “rhetorical 
reordering of the nation.”266 And indeed, such nationalist posturing on the EU stage calls to mind 
a similarity, albeit a far less tacit one, to Orbán’s irredentist posturing during his first term in 
office. 
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Nonetheless, PiS’ outlandish posturing, which included an attempt to launch a renewed 
and more aggressive lustration campaign, resulted in a rejection of the party by other 
conservative stakeholders. Tighe recounts an episode involving Stanislaw Wielgus, who had 
been nominated for the post of Archbishop of Warsaw, resigning at his inauguration ceremony in 
order to publicly display opposition to PiS’ politics.267 Tighe explains further that this sentiment 
quickly spread across the entirety of the Polish Catholic Church in what amounted to a crisis on 
the Polish right.268 The dissent from the Church, and PiS’ subsequent performance in the 2007 
elections, together demonstrate the power of pluralism on the right in stifling aspirant nationalist 
politicians like the Kaczyńskis. 
Moreover, the difficulty experienced by the Kaczyńskis in attempting to co-opt rhetoric 
regarding the release of a 2007 film further illustrates the salience of pluralism on the right. The 
debate surrounding Andrzej Wajda’s highly anticipated film Katyń, about the national tragedy of 
tremendous importance to Polish nationalism (discussed in section 3), illustrates the way in 
which nationalist myths are collectively held by Poles. Indeed, in a 2007 interview with the BBC, 
Wajda expressed his hopes that the film would not be used for political ends and went on to 
detail his own refraining from engagement with politicians.269 At once Carl Tighe recounts the 
rebuke of president Lech Kaczyński for his attempt to manipulate the film’s release in order to 
suit his re-election ambitions.270 As such the resistance to and difficulty experienced by 
Kaczyński’s attempts at co-opt the nationalist undercurrents of the film seem to affirm the 
difference between the political cultures of Poland and Hungary, insofar as their national 
mythologies are concerned. 
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 It follows that the Kaczyński brothers were far from successful in their attempts to 
consolidate the right during their time in office. This is because their divisive political style 
alienated too many of the competing factors on the right. For instance, one of the least popular 
tactics undertaken by PiS involved the introduction of greater surveillance legislation toward 
other members of parliament.271 Connolly adds that after Lech Kaczyński’s accession to the 
presidency (and his brother’s subsequent accession to the prime ministership) the PiS 
government undertook a nationalist campaign aimed at “their own version of social cleansing, 
after years of what they [saw] as moral decline.”272 All of this was tied up with, as mentioned, 
heightened tensions with Germany (as discussed) and Russia, along with an onslaught of 
paranoid rhetoric regarding the legacy of communism.273 In particular it seems that PiS’ 
nationalist posturing was ineffective at consolidating other important conservative stakeholders, 
whether political or cultural, and as such it hurt their chances of winning reelection. 
While the 2007 elections resulted in the defeat of PiS by the PO, the former party 
nonetheless emerged as the clear representative of Poland’s right. To begin, the elections were 
announced after the aforementioned SRP leader Andrzej Lepper alleged corruption within the 
government.274 Anna Gwiazda explains that the race soon took a turn in the favor of Donald 
Tusk and his PO party following a televised debate between Tusk and Jaroslaw Kaczyński, 
which 67% of respondents to an opinion poll indicated Tusk had won.275 The final results were 
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indeed favorable to PO, which won 41.5% of the votes and 209 seats in the Sejm.276 PiS, in turn, 
was handily defeated and finished in second place, with 32.1% of the votes and 166 
parliamentary seats.277 However at suggested, the party was presented with an optimistic 
situation as regarded its status on the right. Namely, the far-right SRP and LPR parties had both 
failed to obtain a single parliamentary seat.278 Gwiazda explains that this in turn translated into 
an additional two million votes and a five-point increase in vote share over PiS’ 2005 
performance.279 As such, while PiS’ overly divisive posturing lost them the parliamentary control 
they had only recently obtained, the party’s relevance in Polish political life was far from over. 
In sum, while PiS encountered difficulty in its attempts to mobilize nationalist rhetoric in 
the realms of lustration or the Katyń massacre, the party nevertheless managed to crowd out 
competing nationalist factions after just two years in office. Further, the Kaczyńskis posturing on 
the European stage amounted to an early example of their successful mobilization of ethnic 
nationalist rhetoric. With this in mind, we may jump ahead to PiS’ subsequent re-election in 
2015. 
 
4.2d. 2015: The re-election of PiS 
 In this section I will examine the political circumstances that contributed to PiS’ 
successful re-election in 2015. Altogether this was facilitated by a pragmatic electoral strategy 
coupled with a continued dedication to the consolidation of the politics of the right. As we will 
see, the results of the 2015 parliamentary elections delivered an unprecedented victory to PiS, 
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which in turn facilitated an even greater consolidation of power by the party, both on the right 
and in politics generally.  
During its time in opposition PiS continued its strategy of attempting to claim nationalist 
myths as their own. In one example, Agnieszka Pasieka recounts the controversy surrounding a 
historical reenactment performed in summer 2013 titled “Volhynia 1943: The victims do not call 
for revenge but for remembrance.” Pasieka explains that the national debate around this 
reenactment had to do with its subject matter; that is, while historical reenactments in Poland are 
a popular pastime, they are typically limited to medieval, or otherwise distant historical 
themes.280 This event, by contrast, was intended to reenact the contested massacre perpetrated by 
Ukrainian partisans against Polish villagers during the Second World War.281 Pasieka explains 
that while the then-incumbent PO advocated for a bilateral investigation of the event given its 
uncertain history, representatives from PiS, along with the SLD, took a reactionary stance, 
calling for the events of the ‘Volhynian Massacre’ to be termed a genocide.282 Once again, 
however, Pasieka’s description of the SLD’s involvement points us back to the relatively high 
degree of competition for control over nationalist myths in Poland as compared to in Hungary. 
However despite this, the results of the 2015 elections reshaped Poland’s political landscape in 
favor of PiS. 
PiS’ 2015 electoral victory resulted from, among other factors, clever repositioning. For 
one, perhaps in an acknowledgment of his personal unelectability, Jaroslaw Kaczyński opted to 
remain the chairman of PiS and in turn not to run for office (Macierewicz was also sidelined).283 
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Further, PiS’ candidates deliberately ran on economic issues and at once avoided social issues in 
an effort to win over more moderate voters.284 PiS benefited from being the opposition party 
running against a two-term incumbent, and at once this economic message appealed to many, 
especially poorer rural voters.285 Altogether PiS’ strategy of pragmatism paid off: the party 
garnered a resounding 37.6% of the vote in comparison to PO’s 24.1%.286 This amounted to a 
78-seat gain for PiS and a 69-seat loss for PO.287 Altogether, then, we can conclude that the 2015 
elections were an unprecedented victory for Kaczyński and his party. 
At once it is clear that through this election PiS managed to shift Poland’s political 
dialogue to the right. This was evidenced, for one, by the fact that the left-liberal coalition United 
Left (Zjednoczona Lewica, ZL), which included the once-incumbent SLD, failed to obtain any 
parliamentary seats.288 This was the first time that the left had altogether failed to obtain any 
parliamentary seats in Poland’s history as a post-communist state – surely a victory for 
conservatism and for PiS in turn.289 It follows that the 2015 election amounted in a consolidation 
of power on the right by PiS. For one this was accommodated by the Catholic Church. Rafal 
Lesniczak’ findings confirm that Catholic media displayed a preference for PiS at the expense of 
PO.290 While the Catholic Church did not involve itself in the election outright, Lesniczak details 
a July 2015 Ariadna poll in which 63% of respondents indicated that the influence of the 
Catholic Church in politics was for whatever reason too strong.291 Moreover, the collaboration of 
the populist Kukiz’15 party with far-right nationalists, which in turn netted them 8.8% of the 
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vote, further affirmed the salience of ethnic nationalist rhetoric and perhaps even mirrored the 
situation of Fidesz and Jobbik in Hungary (with PiS as the most powerful voice on the right).292 
Finally we can conclude that despite its centrist posturing, PiS was as ever interested in 
mobilizing populist, ethnic nationalist rhetoric. For one the party’s strongest support was taken 
from Poland’s poorer regions in the East and South. In an interview with Wojciech Kudelski, the 
mayor of the Polish town of Siedlec, Traub reports that Kudelski was taken with PiS’ 
representation of Poland’s “true values.”293 Traub also describes that PiS’ victory was in part 
won as a result of a speech given by Kaczyński about the diseases carried by refugees.294 Indeed 
a report from Reuters details the speech, describing Kaczyński as “[warning] that refugees from 
the Middle East could bring diseases and parasites to Poland.”295 This openly ethnic nationalist 
posturing, and its conversion into an electoral victory just ten days later, indeed demonstrated a 
successful mobilization of nationalist rhetoric by Kaczyński and his party in turn. 
As demonstrated, the 2015 election presented PiS with an unprecedented mandate. The 
party successfully expanded its reach to secure more centrist voters along with a renewed 
commitment from its reliable base of poorer, rural Poles. This in turn amounted to a vigorous 
consolidation by PiS on the right. The degree to which this has undermined the health of 
Poland’s democracy, then, will be explored in the following section. 
 
4.2e. The conditions of Polish democracy under PiS 
Since returning to office in 2015, PiS has openly taken steps to reverse the course of 
Polish democratization and to consolidate its own power in turn. Here I will discuss some of the 
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ways in which PiS has attempted to, and been successful, in doing so. I will then move on to a 
discussion of the conditions of Polish democracy as based on aggregative reports. The results 
show that while the situation in Poland is far from that of Hungary, it is nonetheless angling in 
that direction. 
After re-assuming power in 2015, PiS renewed its open hostility toward the EU. 
According to one account, Kaczyński’s unwillingness to “play the game” with Brussels makes 
him a more serious threat to liberal democracy and stability in Europe than even Orbán.296 (The 
same account points to the highly personalistic manner in which Kaczyński leads PiS, suggesting 
that if the party continues its hold on power, Polish politics could increasingly center around 
Kaczyński’s political ambitions.297) At once PiS has demonstrated itself as disinterested in any 
threats from the EU under the guise of Polish sovereignty.298 The relationship between the Polish 
government and the EU is an important one, Foy and Robinson explain, seeing as Poland has the 
sixth-largest economy in the EU.299 All together, PiS’ anti-EU posturing, not unlike Orbán’s, 
seems to signal its commitment to the strategy of embracing illiberalism for its own anti-
democratic ends. 
That PiS at once ramped up populist sentiment in order to erode Poland’s checks and 
balances is clear. Traub explains that one of the first moves taken by this new government was to 
conduct a largely baseless audit of its predecessor in an effort to stir up paranoia.300 Moreover, 
Buckley gives the example of PiS’ rapid attempts to take control of Poland’s public media 
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channels in a manner reminiscent of Fidesz five years prior.301 Buckley goes further, arguing that 
PiS was distinct even from Fidesz in the speed with which they launched this process.302 Finally, 
there is the case of Poland’s constitutional tribunal, which Kelemen explains resulted in PiS’ 
contestation of its predecessor’s appointments to Poland’s highest court.303 In their study of 
authoritarian regimes, Levitsky and Way argue that the judiciary is often targeted early on as an 
institution to be weakened in order to facilitate the authoritarian’s consolidation of power.304 In 
sum, all of these moves signal attempts by PiS to consolidate power through anti-democratic 
means. 
At once ethnic nationalist and nativist sentiment has risen in Poland in recent years. One 
Eurobarometer poll of Polish citizens indicates a rise in sentiment regarding globalization as 
representing a “threat to employment” from 26% to 32% between June 2009 and May 2012, 
along with a corollary drop from 47% to 41% in sentiments that it represented a “good 
opportunity” (see figure 4.2.1).305 Additionally, and more relevantly to PiS’ most recent term in 
office, in the two-year period between November 2014 and November 2016, negative sentiment 
toward immigration from outside of the EU jumped from 44% to 64%, while positive sentiment 
fell from 39% to 28% in the same period (see figure 4.2.2).306 While sentiment on this point has 
remained virtually stagnant for the EU in the aggregate (rose from 35% to 37% positive and 
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remained at 57% negative, over the same period), it is noteworthy that in all four of the post-
communist CEE states in question, by contrast sentiment polarized drastically.307 
Finally, PiS’ detrimental effects on Poland’s democracy has already been anticipated by 
aggregative measures of democracy. For one, Freedom House’s democracy score for Poland rose 
from 2.18 to 2.32 in the period from 2014 to 2016.308 Further, Poland’s ‘freedom in the world’ 
score rose between 2016 and 2017 from 1 to 1.5 as a result of a perceived deterioration in its 
civil liberties.309 V-Dem figures only report statistics through 2015.  
This in turn points to the contemporary, and as such uncertain, nature of political 
developments in Poland. As such a comparison of Hungary and Poland will provide some 
qualitative insights into Poland’s democratic prospects. 
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4.3. Comparing the cases, assessing the future of Polish democracy 
 As discussed, in Hungary the lack of pluralism on the right facilitated Viktor Orbán’s 
initial accession to power. Following his first term in office, Orbán continued to consolidate 
power on the right by mobilizing and taking ownership over Hungary’s ethnic nationalist 
tradition. His electoral victory in 2010 cemented his hold on power, and the condition of 
Hungarian democracy has steadily regressed in each year since. By contrast, Poland from the 
start was characterized by a greater degree of pluralism among its conservative element. This 
was, among other things, due to the strong presence of the Catholic Church in politics, as well as 
to a greater degree of distance between its national myths and politics than in Hungary. At once 
this political landscape saw the emergence and eventual success of PiS, most recently in 2015, 
following which the party has already begun to make strides in altering the course of Poland’s 
democratization.  
 PiS’ 2015 victory signaled a greater degree of consolidation on the right than ever before. 
As discussed, the left coalition ZL failed to get any seats, and the political spectrum on the whole 
shifted to the right. At once PiS was central to this development. Moreover, as discussed some 
agents of the Catholic Church seem to have endorsed, however tacitly, Poland’s political right 
(i.e., PiS) over the candidates of the center. Finally, since taking office PiS has made significant 
strides in undoing the checks and balances of Poland’s democracy, arguably at a rate even faster 
than what was seen in Hungary following Orbán’s return to power in 2010. 
 However there are a number of signs that point to PiS’ continued inability to fully 
consolidate political control, and as such cement its power to the extent that Fidesz has. For one, 
PiS has encountered a greater degree of institutional resistance than Orbán. There is also the 
matter of PiS’ being a far younger party: after all, it came onto the scene a full seven years after 
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Fidesz and has only ever held power for a fraction of the time. This in turn suggests that Poland’s 
democratic norms have had more time to develop and mature apart from the Kaczyńskis. Finally, 
as we saw, Orbán was aided throughout his career by a number of devastating failures of his 
competitors (most notably the revelations from Gyurcsány). While the 2015 election in Poland 
did see an unprecedented neutralization, this faction was nonetheless nowhere near as discredited 
as the MSZP in 2006. By contrast, as discussed, PiS is faced with having to compete against the 
centrist PO, yet another pluralizing factor in the way of PiS’ consolidation. Finally it is worth 
considering in this context whether the mobilization of nationalism by PiS is qualitatively 
different, and thereby less concerted, than that of Fidesz, namely given the more multifaceted 
nature of Polish conservatism.  
 The question thus remains of whether Kaczyński and PiS will succeed in taking Poland in 
the direction that Orbán has in Hungary. For one, Ireneusz Karolewski and Roland Benedikter 
state their position clearly in the article “Poland is not Hungary,” pointing to attacks by the 
Orban regime on freedom of speech laws, the power of the media, and revisions of the 
Constitution, all of which they say has failed to take place in Poland.310 While indeed the Polish 
media may be more independent and a Jobbik analogue may not exist as clearly there, it is 
nevertheless important to consider that one of Orbán’s earliest steps following his return to 
power in 2010 was to lower the mandatory retirement age for judges, much like PiS in the 
aforementioned constitutional standoff.  
Karolewski and Benedikter argue further that Hungary’s authoritarianism is compounded 
by its sympathy toward Russia, while no such thing could ever be possible in Poland. Here I am 
reminded of Professor Peter Steiner’s comment of “duty over pleasure” as pertaining to Polish 
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foreign policy, namely that Poland is far more inclined to do ideological battle with Germany 
rather than Russia.311 And of course there is the actual demonstrated relationship between 
Kaczyński and Orbán, most recently as evidenced by their private, 6-hour meeting held on 
January 6, 2016.312 Foy relates that Orbán described his friendship with Kaczyński at one point 
as an “old boy’s club.”313 Indeed this mutual sympathy is troubling, not least in its implications 
for EU procedure. That is, an abstention from either party could prevent censure of the other.314 
From here we can conclude that, barring any radical changes, PiS’ continued hold on 
power will bode poorly for the future of Poland’s democracy. In particular, if PiS manages to 
continue its consolidation of Poland’s conservative element, particularly by discrediting its main 
competitor the PO, we can readily expect to see analogous developments in Poland to what has 
taken place in Hungary. By contrast, if the integrity of Poland’s conservative pluralism holds, 
PiS will be as unsuccessful as before in mobilizing nationalist rhetoric for its own political gains.  
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5. Conclusions 
 A review of the literature in section 2 suggested several important conclusions. Namely, 
that nationalism in CEE is generally ethnic in nature, but that this in turn can be used for both 
pro- and anti-democratic ends. These findings at once revealed that the differentiating factors 
pointed to by Vachudova and Snyder would not be as important to nationalist developments in 
Hungary and Poland as would broader, underlying historical factors. Furthermore, the review of 
the literature at once pointed to the need for an additional variable in explaining the relationship 
between nationalism and anti-democratic trends in Hungary and Poland (given, as mentioned, its 
complicated nature).  
 In turn the discussion from section 3.1 confirmed the rather ubiquitous nature of CEE’s 
experience of communism, along with its implications for nationalism in the region. This finding 
controverted the expectation by Vachudova and Snyder that ethnic nationalism would only play 
a role in the politics of certain states based on, as demonstrated, rather transient factors. The 
overview of Hungary and Poland’s nationalist traditions in sections 3.2 and 3.3 affirmed 
Vachudova and Snyder’s categorization of the two states as politically similar, but it at once 
drew attention to their prolific histories of ethnic nationalism. Section 3 on the whole, then, 
affirmed the salience of ethnic nationalism in both states and prepared us for an investigation of 
these developments in the post-communist period. 
 The discussion from section 4.1 focused on the key role played by pluralism on the right, 
whether in facilitating or stalling authoritarian developments in Hungary and Poland, 
respectively. An analysis of Orbán’s initial rise to power in the 1990s revealed that his election 
resulted from a unique combination of factors, including his timely shift to Hungary’s enervated 
right as well as a partnership with the far-right Smallholders. Orbán’s first term in office saw his 
Golant 100 
mobilization and increased ownership over ethnic nationalist rhetoric, particularly as relating to 
the EU. In turn, as demonstrated by the results of the 2002 election, despite his loss Orbán 
managed to consolidate Hungary’s right to an unprecedented degree and in so doing polarized 
Hungarian politics on the whole. The elections that led to Orbán’s subsequent return to office in 
2010 represented a ‘perfect storm,’ given that Orbán’s opposition had lost credibility in the 
ensuing years, and further that the political mood had shifted decidedly to the right. Finally, 
Orbán’s tenure since returning to office in 2010 has amounted to a wholesale deterioration of 
democracy that, as of 2017, appears unwavering. 
 Relatedly, the findings from section 4.2 revealed that in contrast to Hungary, Poland was 
characterized by a far more pluralistic right. This was evidenced first by the greater autonomy 
and importance of the Catholic Church, as well as the relative universality of national 
experiences such as Poland’s resistance to communism (i.e., the Solidarity movement). Then, a 
review of Poland’s political history over the past twenty-five years revealed a greater degree of 
competition over its right-wing politics. In section 4.2a, the examples of Lech Wałęsa and the 
failed lustration campaigns, among others, demonstrated the competition for and subsequent 
failure of highly personalistic elements among Poland’s political right. The findings from section 
4.2b in turn discussed the legitimating role played by the collapse of the AWS coalition in giving 
birth to PiS, along with PiS’ subsequent attempts to consolidate the right in the years leading up 
to the 2005 election. Examples of PiS’ mobilization of rhetoric in conjunction with other 
conservative elements, namely Radio Maryja, explained its subsequent victory in 2005. In turn 
PiS’ divisive and overly ambitious political style while in office both alienated a number of 
conservative political stakeholders and at once helped them consolidate Poland’s political right 
to an extent, though they nevertheless were unable to convert into a parliamentary victory at this 
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time. PiS’ more recent electoral victory in 2015 represented an unprecedented consolidation of 
Poland’s conservative elements, and their subsequent time in office has already instigated anti-
democratic shifts in Poland’s political life.  
 Finally, in turning to the future, the discussion from section 4.3 affirmed that, while 
Poland’s democratic prospects are far from favorable with PiS in office, the party nevertheless 
has its work cut out in crowding out the centrist competitor PO before it can fully consolidate 
power over the right and in Polish politics in general. As such this paper predicts that Polish 
politics will witness ongoing ideological conflict, as well as increased competition for control, 
between these two parties. 
And indeed, while this study was fairly restricted to the two states in consideration, I 
believe these findings regarding the relationship between ethnic nationalism and pluralism on the 
right are generalizable to the broader trend of right-wing populism sweeping across the West. 
This is evidenced by two very recent examples. First, in the recent Dutch elections, the 
conservative Prime Minister Mark Rutte managed to secure his hold on power by playing to 
some of Geert Wilders’ main talking points, thereby undermining Wilders’ ownership of the 
rhetoric of the right.315 An account from Wilders’ brother, Paul, affirms this. In a recent 
interview he stated that “The smaller [right-wing] parties, who won a lot of votes off [Geert 
Wilders’] PVV, express themselves in less extreme language.”316 On the other hand, the 
polarization within the French election seems to bode poorly for its democratic prospects at 
present. Namely, the involvement of the previously favored conservative candidate, Francois 
Fillon, in a graft scandal has greatly diminished his chances and at once energized the more polar 
                                               
315 Elizabeth Roberts, “Dutch election: Rutte's victory is official,” CNN (Atlanta), March 21, 2017.  
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candidates Emmanuel Macron and Marine Le Pen.317 While Le Pen too is involved in these 
allegations, the failure of the comparatively moderate Fillon will only further help her chances of 
claiming France’s right.318 
  
                                               
317 “France election: Fillon campaign manager quits along with allied party,” BBC News (London, UK), 
March 3, 2017. 
318 Remi Piet,“The populist drift of the French election campaign,” Al Jazeera (Doha), March 28, 2017. 
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Figure 4.1.3. 
Source: Eurobarometer. 
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Figure 4.1.5. 
Source: Eurobarometer. 
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Figure 4.1.7. 
Source: V-Dem. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2.1. 
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